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A NEW NAME AND A CHANGING EMPHASIS FOR
FOOD ASSISTANCE 
The Food Stamp Program formally passed into history on October 
1, 2008, when it was rechristened the Supplemental Nutrition Assis-
tance Program (SNAP). In the previous four decades, the Food Stamp 
Program reliably and unceremoniously helped millions of low-income 
individuals and families in the United States obtain more nutritious 
diets than they could otherwise afford. The program has been a vital 
strand in an otherwise fraying U.S. social safety net, retaining its basic 
structure during the welfare reform of the 1990s, and even expanding 
during the first decade of the 2000s.1 
A renaming may have been overdue, given some of the changes 
in the Food Stamp Program. First, the program altered the way that it 
issues benefits. Since 2004, when the last of the states implemented 
its Electronic Benefit Transfer (EBT) system, monthly food assistance 
benefits have been credited to plastic debit cards rather than being dis-
tributed as coupons. So, “food stamps” themselves have become a thing 
of the past. Second, the federal and state governments have become 
more interested in leveraging the available food assistance into bet-
ter nutritional outcomes and healthier lifestyles for disadvantaged 
families—that is, addressing problems beyond a simple lack of food. 
Third, beginning with the welfare reform of the 1990s, the program 
has increasingly emphasized self-sufficiency, with benefits that were 
expected to supplement the economic resources that people could con-
tribute themselves. The program has adopted several methods to pro-
mote self-sufficiency, including easing income reporting requirements, 
offering employment and training services, and even mandating work 
for some recipients. Despite these major changes, the food stamps name 
has remained in popular use, presumably a reflection of the positive 
image of the program.2 
1 
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
2 Mueser, Ribar, and Tekin 
This third area—the relationship between food assistance and eco-
nomic self-sufficiency—is the focus of this book. Within this area, we 
are keenly interested in how food assistance serves and sometimes fails 
to serve the working poor through its rules and administrative practices. 
We will be the first to admit that program rules and administration 
are an unglamorous, if not dowdy, topic; we are not holding our breath 
waiting for Hollywood to turn our book into a movie script. However, 
as several of us have discovered in our research, the relatively mundane 
rules that are the book’s central characters play surprisingly large roles 
in people’s program experiences and participation behavior. We hope to 
shine a light on some of these rules and practices. 
Our book marshals evidence from three states—Georgia, Missouri, 
and South Carolina—where we were able to obtain detailed administra-
tive records about households and their members from electronic case 
management systems and other databases. The book investigates the 
relationship between different program rules, program participation, 
and work from October 1, 2000 (the start of the 2001 federal fiscal year) 
to September 30, 2007 (the end of the 2007 fiscal year). Thus, the analy-
sis covers a period that extends back two years prior to the enactment 
of the Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002 (the 2002 Farm 
Bill) and forward five years after that legislation to just before the start 
of the Great Recession. The passage of the 2002 Farm Bill, as we sub-
sequently discuss, was an important event because of the flexibility that 
it granted states in administering the Food Stamp Program to address 
issues associated with the working poor. As the main analysis focuses 
on the era before the program’s name change, we generally refer to it 
as the Food Stamp Program, although our discussion of the program in 
the recent period often uses SNAP. The issues we raise remain highly 
relevant for the current program, which, in terms of basic structure, has 
changed relatively little since the period of our analysis. 
In the remainder of this chapter, we begin by providing general back-
ground on the Food Stamp Program. We discuss the rules that define it 
as a means-tested entitlement serving as one of the main pillars of the 
U.S. safety net. We then turn to a discussion of the trends in the recent 
food stamp caseload and the incidence of paid work among recipients. 
The evidence suggests that substantial numbers of households that are 
eligible for food stamp benefits do not receive them, and that the extent 
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
   
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
 
Introduction 3 
to which eligible individuals enroll is influenced by the states’ adminis-
tration of the program. We highlight two elements of importance: pro-
cedures for certifying potential recipients and recertifying recipients, 
and policies for treatment of able-bodied adults without dependents. 
These will be the primary focus of our analyses in the book. 
GENERAL BACKGROUND ON THE FOOD
STAMP PROGRAM 
To start our examination, it is useful to review the structure of the 
Food Stamp Program, which operates throughout the United States. The 
program accounts for the lion’s share of government food assistance 
expenditures. The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) spent $54.3 
billion for food assistance in fiscal year (FY) 2007. Of that total, $33 
billion, or 61 percent, went to the Food Stamp Program (Oliveira 2008). 
The program served an average of 11.8 million households with 26.5 
million people per month in 2007, providing participants with an aver-
age monthly per-person benefit of $96. The next most expensive food 
assistance program was the National School Lunch Program, which 
cost the federal government $8.7 billion but served more than 30.6 
million children on a daily basis. Among the other large programs, the 
USDA spent $2.2 billion on the School Breakfast Program; $5.5 billion 
on the Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants and 
Children; and $2.2 billion on the Child and Adult Care Food Program. 
We can also compare the Food Stamp Program to other major low-
income assistance programs. The total amount spent on food stamp 
benefits far surpasses the amount spent on benefits for the Temporary 
Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program. In FY 2009, the federal 
and state governments spent $11 billion on cash assistance for TANF 
($31 billion if supportive expenditures are included), which served an 
average of 4.0 million people per month (Office of Family Assistance 
2012). However, food stamp spending was dwarfed by the $316 billion 
that was spent on Medicaid in FY 2007 (U.S. Centers for Medicare 
and Medicaid Services 2008). Over the past decade, SNAP has grown 
in importance. By 2012, the SNAP budget had swollen to over $89 
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billion (including funds allocated by the American Recovery and Rein-
vestment Act), although the allocation declined to under $80 billion by 
2017, as a result of the economic recovery (USDA 2013, 2017). 
From a public finance and public administration perspective, the 
Food Stamp Program has operated as a federal/state partnership. In this 
arrangement, the federal government pays the full cost of benefits, cov-
ers half of the states’ administrative expenses, and sets many of the 
overarching program rules, including the financial formulas for eligi-
bility and benefits. The states, in turn, are responsible for administer-
ing the program on a day-to-day basis. The states receive and process 
applications for assistance, determine applicants’ eligibility, operate 
and distribute benefits through their EBT systems, reassess partici-
pants’ eligibility and benefits, and provide other services, such as out-
reach, nutritional education, and employment and training services. The 
states have considerable latitude in the way that they administer their 
programs. 
The Food Stamp Program is a means-tested entitlement program. 
Means-tested signifies both that eligibility is restricted to households 
with few financial resources and that the assistance that eligible house-
holds can receive is reduced as their incomes increase. Entitlement indi-
cates that spending in the program is not capped and that all eligible 
households can receive benefits. This may seem to be a minor point, but 
it contrasts with the structure of some other programs, such as TANF, in 
which federal spending is provided through lump-sum block grants to 
the states. If the states exhaust their TANF grants, they can turn eligible 
needy families away.3 
Means-testing in the Food Stamp Program is generally accom-
plished through three specific criteria: a gross-income test, a net-income 
test, and an asset test. To pass the gross income test in the contiguous 
United States, a nonelderly household’s total monthly pretax income 
from all sources, including other transfer payments, must be less than 
130 percent of the government’s monthly poverty threshold for that 
household’s size. In FY 2007, the applicable monthly threshold for a 
four-person household was $2,167.4 
Households must also satisfy a net-income test. The net income, 
which is also used in the benefit calculation, accounts for several poten-
tial and actual expenses in the household. For general expenses, the 
net income formula includes a standard deduction that varies modestly 
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with household size; in FY 2007, the standard deduction for a four-
person household was $139. To account for work expenses, 20 per-
cent of a household’s earnings are also excluded from net income. The 
net income formula additionally excludes child care expenses, hous-
ing (shelter) costs over a threshold, and excess medical expenses (for 
those disabled or aged 60 or older) and adjusts for utility costs. Once 
these adjustments are made, a household’s monthly net income must be 
below the relevant poverty threshold to receive benefits. In FY 2007, 
the threshold for a household of four was $1,667. 
Finally, at the time of our analysis, a household’s countable assets 
had to be less than $2,000 if the household had no elderly members 
(no members aged 60 or older) or $3,000 if the household had one or 
more elderly members. However, an increasing number of states have 
eliminated asset restrictions. By 2007, 7 states had done so, increasing 
to 35 states by 2013.5 Asset limits have also increased slightly since the 
time of our analysis. 
Households can qualify for food stamps under some other circum-
stances. For example, households are categorically eligible for food 
stamps if all the members already receive benefits from TANF, Supple-
mental Security Income (SSI), or General Assistance programs. House-
holds that are categorically eligible must meet the income and asset 
tests of those other programs but not those of the Food Stamp Program. 
In addition to categorical eligibility, some states offer food stamps as 
short-term transitional assistance to families with members who have 
left the TANF rolls for work; these families might not be financially eli-
gible at the time of the transitional benefit but would have been earlier. 
Food stamps are also sometimes provided under emergency circum-
stances, such as natural disasters. 
If a household is eligible for the Food Stamp Program, its benefits 
are calculated by taking a maximum benefit allotment, which varies 
by household size, and subtracting 30 percent of the household’s net 
income. In FY 2007, the maximum monthly allotment for a house-
hold with four people was $588. There is also a minimum benefit, so 
all households that are eligible can potentially receive some positive 
amount of assistance. For the period that we consider, the minimum 
benefit for households with one or two people was $10. 
To see how the benefit and eligibility formulas work, consider a 
hypothetical four-person family in 2007 whose only income came from 
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
  
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
6 Mueser, Ribar, and Tekin 
a single earner who worked 40 hours per week at an hourly wage of 
$10. Also, assume that the family had no assets. On average there are 
4.33 weeks in a month, so the family’s prospective pretax gross income 
would have been $1,732 (= $10/hour × 40 hours × 4.33 weeks). This 
amount is slightly above the poverty threshold but below 130 percent 
of the threshold, so the household passes the gross-income test. If the 
family had no other special expenses (e.g., its shelter costs were less 
than half of its adjusted income), the family would take a work expense 
deduction of $346 (= 0.2 × $1,732) and a standard deduction of $139, 
leaving a net income of $1,247, which is below the net-income thresh-
old. The household passes both income tests and has no assets to con-
sider, so it is eligible to participate in the Food Stamp Program. The 
household’s monthly food stamp benefit would have been $214 (= $588 
– 0.3 × $1,247). 
The means-tested eligibility and benefit formulas immediately 
reveal the tensions that exist in the Food Stamp Program between the 
goals of maintaining program integrity and promoting self-sufficiency. 
On the one hand, we want assistance to be targeted toward those who 
are unfortunate enough to truly need it. Such targeting is necessary to 
keep the program’s costs in line. It is also vital to maintaining pub-
lic faith and support for the program. A few news exposés that catch 
food stamp recipients using their assistance to purchase alcohol or lot-
tery tickets or a well-covered political speech that rails against fraudu-
lent beneficiaries collecting assistance on behalf of nonexistent family 
members can quickly undo much of the goodwill that has built up in 
the program. 
On the other hand, means-testing also creates disincentives to 
obtaining an income independently and becoming self-sufficient. Once 
a family’s income passes the amounts of the deductibles in the net-
income formula, its benefits are reduced (effectively “taxed”) at mar-
ginal rates of $0.30 for each extra dollar of unearned income and $0.24 
for each extra dollar of earned income. We can get some perspective on 
the possible disincentive effects of these benefit reduction rates by com-
paring them to regular income tax rates. In 2007, the highest marginal 
federal income tax rate of 35 percent was only slightly steeper than the 
food stamp unearned income benefit reduction rate, and the top federal 
tax rate did not apply for married-couple households until their adjusted 
incomes passed nearly $350,000! In that same year, marginal federal 
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income tax rates of 25 percent did not apply until adjusted incomes of 
married-couple households passed $63,700. In the 2007 tax year, less 
than a quarter of U.S. tax filers paid marginal tax rates of 25 percent or 
higher (U.S. Internal Revenue Service 2009). The food stamp benefit 
reduction rate is less onerous than the rates in some other assistance 
programs but nevertheless lowers the incentives to work.6 
As we shall see, the tension between the program integrity and self-
sufficiency goals, which appears in the benefit and eligibility formulas, 
emerges in other aspects of the Food Stamp Program. 
RECENT TRENDS IN FOOD STAMP RECEIPT AND WORK 
After falling throughout the second half of the 1990s, food stamp 
caseloads began to rise in 2001. Table 1.1 reports national estimates 
of the average monthly food stamp caseload from FY 2001 through 
FY 2007 as well as FY 2010 and FY 2014, which we compiled using 
information from the Food Stamp Program Quality Control (FSPQC) 
database.7 
Table 1.1 Estimated Average Monthly Caseloads in the Food Stamp 
Program, FY 2001–2007 
Participating households Participating individuals 
In house- Percent in 
With Percent holds with households 
Fiscal All earnings with All earnings with 
year (000s) (000s) earnings (000s) (000s) earnings 
2001 7,450 2,009 27.0 17,297 6,603 38.2 
2002 8,201 2,299 28.0 19,041 7,426 39.0 
2003 8,971 2,533 28.2 20,934 8,105 38.7 
2004 10,070 2,896 28.8 23,486 9,249 39.4 
2005 10,854 3,180 29.3 24,881 9,901 39.8 
2006 11,315 3,364 29.7 25,595 10,493 41.0 
2007 11,563 3,445 29.8 25,926 10,632 41.0 
2010 18,369 5,498 29.9 39,759 16,179 40.7 
2014 22,445 7,016 31.3 45,847 19,477 42.5 
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from the Food Stamp Program Quality Control data-
base. 
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The estimates in Table 1.1 show that the numbers of participating 
households and people in the Food Stamp Program rose steadily after 
2001. The increases in the first few years of the data can be partly attrib-
uted to the deteriorating job market following the recession in 2001. 
Nationally, the unemployment rate climbed through the middle of 2003, 
peaking at 6.3 percent in June of that year. Unemployment subsequently 
abated, falling to 4.4 percent by the end of 2006 and still holding near 
that level at 4.7 percent in September 2007. Despite these improve-
ments, food stamp caseloads continued to swell, with the fastest growth 
occurring just after the job market turned around in 2003. By FY 2007, 
the number of participating households was 55 percent higher than it 
had been six years earlier, while the number of participating individuals 
was 50 percent higher. Expressed another way, 8.6 percent of the U.S. 
population was receiving food stamps in an average month in FY 2007 
compared to 6.1 percent in 2001.8 
For Table 1.1, we also estimate the number of participating house-
holds that reported receiving any earnings in the month as well as the 
number of people living in those households. We refer to the households 
with earnings as “working households.” The number of working food 
stamp households rose over this period and grew faster than the overall 
caseload. In an average month in FY 2001, working households made 
up 27 percent of the food stamp caseload; by 2007, their share had risen 
to nearly 30 percent. Working food stamp households are more likely 
to be married and to have children than nonworking households and 
therefore tend to be larger. As a result, the share of individual recipients
living in working households is larger than the share of working house-
holds itself. In FY 2001, just over 38 percent of food stamp recipients 
were living in households with earnings, and by 2007, this share had 
increased to 41 percent. 
Table 1.1 shows that working households were both a substantial 
and growing share of the food stamp caseload. This provides some ini-
tial evidence that food stamp benefits may have been playing an impor-
tant supplementary role for families who were trying to support them-
selves through work. The trends also have some puzzling aspects, with 
two features in the trends running counter to what standard economic 
analyses would have predicted. The first puzzle, which we have already 
mentioned, is that caseloads continued to rise long after the turning 
point in the economy. Other things held constant, better job prospects 
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Introduction 9 
after 2003 should have reduced financial needs among families and 
consequently reduced the caseload. Instead, the caseload increased. The 
second puzzle also involves the lack of a turning point, in this case in 
the proportion of food stamp families with earnings. Despite a weak-
ening job market from 2001 through 2003 and a fall in the proportion 
of working families generally (Crouse, Douglas, and Hauan 2007), the 
proportion of working food stamp households grew. Thus, the represen-
tation of working households in the program increased, not only rela-
tive to other food stamp families but also relative to their share in the 
population. Although outside the window of our analysis, the table also 
presents figures for 2010 and 2014, which show dramatic growth in the 
program due to the economic downturn that began at the end of 2007. 
The continued rise in the food stamp caseload after 2004 occurred 
primarily because more people who were eligible for benefits joined or 
remained on the program. A series of reports undertaken under federal 
contract estimated numbers of eligible people and households and par-
ticipation rates among eligible people and households. For these esti-
mated rates, the analysts first ran household-level data from the annual 
demographic (March) files of the Current Population Survey through 
a microsimulation model that applied the income and asset tests to 
impute eligibility for the households. They then separately calculated 
the numbers of participants from administrative records. Participation 
rates were obtained as the ratio of participating households to estimated 
eligible households. Rates were estimated for all households and for 
different types of households. Rates were also calculated for individuals 
in the households. 
Table 1.2 lists selected estimates from these reports for FY 2001 to 
FY 2014, which show how changes in the numbers of eligible house-
holds and individuals and participation rates among these groups each 
contributed to caseload growth. From FY 2001 through 2003, the 
household participation rate hovered at around 50 percent; however, the 
food stamp caseload grew because the number of eligible households 
and individuals grew. In contrast, the numbers of eligible households 
and individuals changed only slightly from FY 2004 to 2006. However, 
the household participation rate jumped, reaching nearly 63 percent 
by FY 2006. Similarly, the participation rate among individuals rose 
from 56.1 percent in FY 2003 to 67.3 percent in 2006. The changes in 
participation rates led to the increase in caseloads during these years. 
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rate for eligible 
Participation Participation individuals in 
Eligible rate for all Eligible rate for all households 
Fiscal households eligible individuals eligible with earnings 
year (000s) households (%) (000s) individuals (%) (%) 
2001 15,107 48.0 31,223 53.9 45.1 
2002 16,693 47.6 34,388 53.8 45.0 
2003 17,784 50.0 36,707 56.1 48.1 
2004 18,079 55.3 37,921 61.1 52.0 
2005 18,219 58.9 37,951 64.7 56.3 
2006 17,779 62.7 37,418 67.3 57.0 
2007 18,499 61.8 38,922 65.8 55.7 
2010 23,268 74.6 52,204 72.7 61.8 
2014 23,415 88.1 51,026 82.9 70.5 
SOURCE: For 2001–2007, Leftin and Wolkwitz (2009, Tables 2 and 5); for 2010 and 
2014, Gray and Cunnyngham (2016, Tables A.1, A.4, E.1, and E.4). 
In FY 2007, the number of eligible households began growing again. 
Although participation rates edged down, the overall caseload grew. 
These reports also estimated participation rates for individuals liv-
ing in households with earnings, which we reproduce in the last col-
umn of Table 1.2. The estimates show that people in eligible working 
households were substantially less likely to participate than people in 
other eligible households. Participation rates for working households 
generally rose during the period that we study but at a slower pace than 
the rates for other households. The estimates also imply that the number 
of individuals in eligible working households generally increased after 
2001.9 
Table 1.2 also shows that the eligible population increased substan-
tially due to the recession beginning in 2007. The participation rate con-
tinued its long-run growth, causing the SNAP population to grow even 
during the economic recovery of 2010–2014. 
  
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
 
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Introduction 11 
FOCUS ON FINANCIAL CHARACTERISTICS IN
EXISTING RESEARCH 
Without a doubt, the income formulas that determine food stamp 
eligibility and benefits are important to program participation. How-
ever, the formulas are poor candidates for explaining program trends 
because they have changed so little over time. Over the period that we 
examine, the benefit formulas were updated only for inflation with just 
a few minor changes to definitions of income. Nevertheless, much of 
the research on participation and caseloads in the Food Stamp Program 
has focused on these financial aspects with little mention of other rules 
and administrative features of the program. 
Several multivariate research studies have focused on financial eli-
gibility. One of the most widely cited articles was published in 1996 by 
Blank and Ruggles, who examine spells of eligibility and participation 
in the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC, the predeces-
sor to TANF) and Food Stamp Programs, using 1985–1989 longitudinal 
data on single mothers from the Survey of Income and Program Partici-
pation (SIPP). Blank and Ruggles (1996) estimate eligibility based on 
monthly financial criteria and participation on the basis of household 
self-reports. The “spells” in their research refer to continuous sequences 
of months in which households are financially eligible for benefits (eli-
gibility spells) or report receiving benefits (participation spells). Blank 
and Ruggles find that eligibility spells tend to be short, with the lengths 
of spells being associated with skills and earnings abilities of the moth-
ers. They also find that economic circumstances, such as changes in 
employment and earnings, contribute in expected ways to how eligibil-
ity and participation spells were resolved. 
What is especially interesting though for our purposes is the impor-
tance of nonfinancial characteristics. Blank and Ruggles (1996) estimate 
that only a quarter of food stamp eligibility spells led to food stamp par-
ticipation spells; they also estimate that 60 percent of food stamp partici-
pation spells ended with households still being eligible for benefits. On 
average, the families exiting food stamps appeared to leave substantial 
amounts of benefits on the table. Blank and Ruggles attribute these find-
ings to “choices” among single mothers, speculating that these choices 
might reflect unmeasured time and money costs of participation, social 
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stigma and psychological discomfort associated with participation, and 
inconvenient but unspecified administrative procedures. 
Gleason, Schochet, and Moffitt (1998) examine food stamp par-
ticipation and nonparticipation spells among a broader group of house-
holds, using SIPP data from the early 1990s. They also find that most 
food stamp participation spells were short. Unlike Blank and Ruggles, 
Gleason et al. do not explicitly condition on eligibility, electing instead 
to include indirect controls and examine “trigger events” that were 
defined in terms of income shocks and demographic changes. Gleason 
et al. find that most, though far from all, changes in participation are 
associated with these trigger events. For example, just over half of the 
movements onto the Food Stamp Program were preceded by decreases 
in earnings among household members. Although framed differently 
than the study by Blank and Ruggles, the study by Gleason et al. leaves 
much less room for administrative and other nonfinancial explanations 
of program behavior. 
Mills et al. (2001), who examine transitions out of the Food Stamp 
Program among single mothers in linked 1997–1999 Current Popula-
tion Survey data, also find that economic changes, such as increases 
in earnings, and demographic changes, such as births and the aging 
of children, were responsible for many families’ exits from assistance. 
Farrell et al. (2003) also look at data from the late 1990s but use the 
SIPP. Their research focuses on families who were eligible for food 
stamps and includes controls for current and past income. They find 
that households whose incomes were variable and only temporarily low 
were less likely to participate than households whose incomes were 
permanently low. However, they also find that less than a quarter of 
eligible nonparticipants had temporarily low incomes. A volume edited 
by Jolliffe and Ziliak (2008) reports mixed evidence regarding income 
variability, with  some analyses indicating that it increases food stamp 
participation but others indicating that it does the opposite. 
These and other multivariate studies show that food stamp partici-
pation is lower for households with earnings than for other households, 
even after we account for other differences between these households, 
such as differences in the sizes and age compositions of the families. 
Plainly, participation is lower because earnings reduce eligibility. How-
ever, as several of the studies show, participation is also lower among 
eligible working families. 
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
 
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Introduction 13 
What explains this pattern of reduced participation? One answer is 
lower benefits. Fraker and Moffitt (1988) and Keane and Moffitt (1998) 
estimate models of employment, food stamp use, and other program 
use and find that increases in the generosity of the food stamp benefit 
formula increase participation. Cross-tabulations reported by Leftin 
and Wolkwitz (2009) also indicate that participation rates increase with 
expected benefits. Thus, to the extent that working households expect 
fewer benefits, they are less likely to enroll in the Food Stamp Program. 
Reduced benefits, however, provide only a partial explanation for 
lower participation. As Blank and Ruggles (1996) have reported, eli-
gible nonparticipating families forgo considerable sums. We can update 
these figures using estimates from Leftin and Wolkwitz (2009). They 
calculate that in an average month in FY 2007, 6.4 million working 
households were eligible for $1.2 billion in food stamp benefits. Of 
these, 3.3 million participated, claiming $868 million in assistance. This 
means that the remaining 3.1 million households could have claimed 
$281 million, or about $106 per household. These expected benefits 
were far below those going to participating households (about $260 per 
household) yet much higher than the expected benefits for nonworking 
nonparticipants ($55 per household).10 So, the average foregone ben-
efits of participation are higher for working nonparticipant households 
than for nonworking nonparticipant households. 
Another possible explanation for the difference in participation 
rates is a difference in program knowledge. The argument for this is 
that nonworking households have more information about Food Stamp 
Program rules either because they have more time available to them or 
because they receive assistance from other programs where they come 
into contact with caseworkers and other sources of program data. This 
explanation is plausible for differences in program entry, but it falls 
apart when considering program exits where households would have 
already been exposed to program rules. The research by Blank and 
Ruggles shows that eligible working families are more likely to end 
their food stamp spells than eligible nonworking families. 
Stigma associated with benefit receipt and use is another potential 
explanation (Moffitt 1983). People who are embarrassed about using 
food stamps or EBT cards might also be more likely to work. More 
generally, attitudes regarding the importance of self-reliance might 
affect both participation and work, leading to the negative association 
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between them. Stigma, attitudes, and preferences may be important, but 
to explain the increases in participation we would need an explanation 
of why these attitudes weakened over the last few years. One would 
expect stigma to be less important in explaining lower rates of recertifi-
cation, since presumably those receiving food stamps had to overcome 
such stigma in order to apply in the first case. 
PROGRAM ADMINISTRATION 
Recent research indicates that other administrative changes may 
have contributed to the growth in food stamp participation rates and 
caseloads. As we mentioned, the states, not the federal government, are 
responsible for direct client contact and implementing program rules. 
In this role, the states shape administrative policies and practices under 
the umbrella of broad federal guidelines. The states’ administrative dis-
cretion was increased through changes in USDA policies and by the 
2002 Farm Bill, including changes that allowed states to make the Food 
Stamp Program more accessible and convenient for working families. 
Among common modifications was the removal or easing of reporting 
requirements involving automobiles owned by the household. Some 
states have gone as far as eliminating all asset requirements. Moves 
by states to establish online registration systems have allowed working 
families to interact with the agency by phone or Internet, substituting 
for in-person interviews. We return to a discussion of these local poli-
cies in the final chapter, when we discuss the evolution of state policy 
up to the present. 
This book focuses on two policies that are especially relevant for 
working families: policies of certification and recertification, and treat-
ment of able-bodied adults without dependents. 
Certification and Recertification 
Rules for financial eligibility for food stamps are based on monthly 
criteria, and economic research that has examined individual partici-
pation histories has often assumed that eligibility is checked monthly. 
However, this is not how the program operates for many people. 
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When a family applies for food stamps, its financial information is 
checked and verified. For example, applicants are asked to document 
their sources of income by providing names of employers and copies 
of pay stubs. Other information is supplied, including the location and 
cost of the residence and the names, ages, and disability status of other 
members. Documentation for these items may include utility bills, rent 
statements, birth certificates, and social security cards. The initial veri-
fication process usually also requires a face-to-face interview with a 
caseworker, although this has been replaced with phone interviews in a 
growing number of states. 
These procedures are a hurdle for needy families, especially those 
who work, because they require a substantial amount of time and effort. 
An employed household head may have to take one day off work to 
submit her application and another day to attend the interview. Because 
many low-wage jobs lack benefits, the time off from work is likely to 
be unpaid. For each of these visits, she may also have to wait for public 
transportation or arrange a ride with a friend or relative if the family 
does not have their own car. 
The procedures also impose costs on the state governments because 
they must keep offices open and pay caseworkers to process the appli-
cations, conduct interviews, and verify the information. Nevertheless, 
verification procedures are necessary to maintain program integrity. 
There is not much controversy regarding whether verification should be 
done but rather how and how often. 
States reduce the costs and inconvenience of verification while still 
maintaining program integrity and more accurate payments by certi-
fying households to receive benefits for given periods of time. Dur-
ing the certification period, which can be a single month but usually 
ranges from a quarter of a year to as much as two years, the household is 
required to report certain types of changes in income and circumstances 
but might not need to provide the same documentation or undergo the 
same rigorous checks as at the initial application. At the end of the cer-
tification period, the household would supply some or all this informa-
tion to recertify its eligibility and payment status. 
The processes of certification and recertification mean that food 
stamp households confront much higher administrative obstacles at the 
time of their initial applications and at subsequent recertification dates 
than at other points during their program participation spells. There is 
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growing evidence that the frequency of recertification affects families’ 
program participation (Kabbani and Wilde 2003) and the duration of 
food stamp participation spells (Gray 2018; Ribar, Edelhoch, and Liu 
2008; Staveley, Stevens, and Wilde 2002). 
Recertification policies help to explain some of the disparity in par-
ticipation rates between working and nonworking households. States 
often set different recertification intervals for households with different 
types of income. The intervals for households with earnings are usually 
shorter than the intervals for households that rely entirely on unearned 
sources, such as TANF, retirement, or disability income. For example, 
South Carolina’s recertification interval for working households before 
FY 2003 was three months, while its interval for many nonworking 
households was one year. The shorter intervals mean that working 
households face substantially higher costs of program compliance than 
do nonworking households. 
Along these same lines, changes in recertification requirements may 
have contributed to changes in participation rates. In the early 2000s, 
many states increased their recertification intervals, which reduced 
compliance costs for families and may have increased participation. 
The USDA also gave states the option to use phone or mail-in recer-
tifications instead of face-to-face interviews for recertifications within 
a one-year interval, making these interim recertifications less onerous. 
Ribar, Edelhoch, and Liu (2008) estimate that South Carolina’s length-
ening of its effective recertification interval for working families from 
three months to six months in FY 2003 may have increased that state’s 
family food stamp caseload by 8 percent.11 This research indicates that 
recertification intervals may be an especially potent administrative tool. 
Still, since this earlier work was based on a single state, it remains to 
be seen how patterns differ across states. Our consideration of Georgia 
and Missouri, in addition to South Carolina, allows us to extend and 
generalize results. 
ABAWD Work Rules and Time Limits 
The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation 
Act of 1996 (PRWORA), which overhauled the cash welfare system, 
also introduced work requirements and time limits for able-bodied 
adults without dependents (ABAWDs) in the Food Stamp Program. 
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The law specifies that ABAWDs who do not work are eligible for only 
three months of benefits in any three-year period. The requirements 
likely reduced food stamp participation among ABAWDS, at least ini-
tially. ABAWDs who were unable or unwilling to work would have had 
their participation curtailed by the short time limits, and some of those 
who did comply with the work requirements would have lost benefits 
and possibly eligibility through increased earnings. At the same time, 
the requirements would have altered the composition of the remaining 
ABAWD caseload by reducing the number of nonworkers and increas-
ing the proportion of workers. 
Over time, however, the ABAWD work provisions were relaxed, 
and their impacts on participation and employment may have decreased. 
PRWORA allowed states to request waivers of the work requirements 
for ABAWDs living in economically distressed areas. In addition, start-
ing in 1997, states also had the option of exempting up to 15 percent of 
their caseload from the ABAWD restrictions. The number of ABAWDs 
who were actually subject to the requirements decreased as more states 
exercised their discretion to waive the rules or exempt clients. In Janu-
ary 2001, 37 states had waivers covering parts of their territories; by 
FY 2008, as the recession loomed, the number of states with approved 
waivers had grown to 47. 
Along with the rising numbers of states requesting any types of 
waivers, there were growing numbers of requests to implement state-
wide waivers—that is, to designate the entire state as having insuffi-
cient jobs. In FY 2008, these included Alaska, the District of Colum-
bia, Michigan, Mississippi, North Carolina, Oregon, Rhode Island, and 
South Carolina. ABAWDs make up only a small share of the caseload. 
The FSPQC data indicate that only 8 percent of food stamp house-
holds in FY 2007 included an ABAWD as a member. However, that 
figure was up from just 7 percent of households in FY 2001. Consistent 
with the relaxed work requirements, employment in the participating 
ABAWD households was down slightly from 30 percent in FY 2001 
to 29 percent in FY 2007. The decreased employment among ABAWD 
households contrasts noticeably with increased employment among 
other households. 
In Chapter 4 we examine the effects of ABAWD policies in more 
detail. The waivers in our three states were applied on an area-by-area 
basis, with the set of areas changing over time. This provides a natural 
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way to test their impact. In particular, we can compare participation 
outcomes across areas and populations that are and are not exempt from 
the policies. As with the analysis of recertification intervals, we exam-
ine how exits from the Food Stamp Program vary with the duration of 
a person’s or household’s program spell. Because the ABAWD poli-
cies involve a three-month time window, they should have their largest 
effect at the start of a food stamp spell. 
This work follows on analyses for South Carolina in Ribar,
Edelhoch, and Liu (2010), which examined Food Stamp Program spells 
for ABAWDs from 1996 to 2005. However, that analysis is limited 
by the fact that in 2003 South Carolina obtained exemptions from the 
ABAWD time limit in all counties. Analyses of Georgia and Missouri 
allow us to extend both the time period and scope of the analyses. 
ORGANIZATION OF THE BOOK 
The focus of this book is the effect of administrative policies on 
the food stamp participation behavior of the working poor. The book 
reports results from empirical analyses of large samples of administra-
tive case records drawn from the states of Georgia, Missouri, and South 
Carolina from FY 2001 through 2007. The next chapter in the book 
describes these data and the analytical samples and measures drawn 
from them. We examine how the case characteristics for our three states 
compare to characteristics for the nation as a whole. The chapter com-
pares the characteristics of these groups to the characteristics of the 
general state caseloads. We also examine alternative ways in which 
“working” households can be defined. 
The next two chapters of the book consider specific administrative 
policies: recertification intervals and ABAWD work rules. Each chapter 
reviews the policies in detail, discusses the incentives or obstacles these 
create for working households’ food stamp participation, and summa-
rizes the existing research on their effects. The chapters then examine 
the association between these policies and households’ participation 
behavior, using the administrative data. 
The final chapter discusses additional administrative policies that 
changed from FY 2001 through 2007 and how these modifications 
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mostly worked to the benefit of households with earnings. We also con-
sider changes occurring since 2007 and discuss their likely impacts. 
Despite variations in the program, the issues addressed in our analy-
sis remain relevant. The recertification requirements remain much the 
same in most states. While the program has often undergone modern-
ization in its implementation, including increased use of the Internet 
and call centers, evidence suggests that many households still have dif-
ficulty meeting recertification requirements.12 The proportion of SNAP
recipients classified as ABAWDs increased from less than 15 percent 
to over 20 percent as states obtained waivers of work requirements fol-
lowing the onset of the recession in 2007. Although waivers in many 
states lapsed after 2013, the proportion remained close to that level at 
least through 2015. In recent years, the SNAP program has received 
greater attention as a variety of proposals to alter its structure have been 
floated. Perhaps more than ever, the role of the program in aiding the 
working poor is in the spotlight. In light of recent developments, we 
consider ways in which the program can be modified to be less onerous 
for working households while still addressing valid program concerns. 
Notes 
1. In contrast, the primary program providing cash support to poor families, Aid to 
Families with Dependent Children, was replaced with a block grant. For a discus-
sion of the politics underlying the relative stability of the Food Stamp Program 
over time, see Gitter (2015). 
2. Since the program is administered at the state level, each state determines the 
name under which the program operates. As of 2018, 6 states continue to use the 
name Food Stamp Program, 28 states use SNAP, and the remainder use some 
other name. See www.usac.org/_res/documents/li/pdf/samples/SNAP-Programs
-by-State.pdf (accessed September 3, 2018). 
3. The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 
replaced Aid to Families with Dependent Children, an open-ended entitlement, 
with Temporary Assistance for Needy Families, a nonentitlement, block-grant 
system. Because of the declines in welfare caseloads since the block grants were 
instituted, no state has yet confronted the situation of suspending TANF enroll-
ments or payments, although many states have instituted provisions that restrict 
eligibility for TANF. In principle, however, the loss of entitlement status means 
that eligible households could be turned away. 
4.	 Higher thresholds apply in Alaska and Hawaii, reflecting the higher food costs 
and other costs of living in those states. Different thresholds are also in place for 
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some types of households with elderly disabled members. In the rest of the book, 
we will only consider rules that apply to the contiguous states. As our primary 
concern will be with potential working households, we will provide only limited 
discussion of rules applying exclusively to elderly or disabled recipients. 
5.	 The modification of asset limits occurred under what has become known as 
“broad-based categorical eligibility,” which we discuss in Chapter 5. See Falk and 
Aussenberg (2014). 
6. Many SNAP households receive services from other government programs, and 
recipients’ effective marginal tax rates are influenced by the interaction of these 
programs. Overall effective tax rates vary dramatically (Moffitt 2016). Hoynes and 
Schanzenbach (2012) examine the effects of the Food Stamp Program on work. 
7.	 Data in the annual FSPQC files are obtained through case reviews and surveys of 
a large random sample of food stamp households in all states (see Wolkwitz and 
Ewell [2008] for details regarding the database). The underlying data are assem-
bled to determine errors that the states may be making in their eligibility decisions 
and benefit awards. The FSPQC data exclude households receiving disaster assis-
tance and recipients facing case closures but appealing those decisions. Because 
of these exclusions, the FSPQC caseload figures fall a little short of figures based 
solely on administrative data. For instance, the administrative records indicate that 
11.8 million households and 26.1 million people received food stamps in an aver-
age month in FY 2007, while the FSPQC data record only 11.6 million households 
and 25.9 million people. 
8. The literature shows that the economy was an important determinant of the food 
stamp caseload but that caseload growth during the middle of the first decade of 
the 2000s was due to policy changes. See Klerman and Danielson (2011), Ganong 
and Liebman (2018), and Ziliak (2016). 
9. Rough estimates of the numbers of eligible people in working households can be 
formed by dividing the Table 1.1 values for individuals participating from work-
ing households by the participation rates from Table 1.2. 
10.	 Lower benefits for this latter group in large part reflect higher levels of unearned 
(usually transfer) income. Different levels of deductions—for example, due to 
excess housing expenses—may also be responsible for differences in benefits. 
11.	 Technically, South Carolina increased its certification period for working families 
to 12 months, with an interim report at 6 months. 
12. As we note in Chapter 3, using data in six states extending up through 2011, Gray 
(2018) shows that recipients are particularly likely to lose benefits at the time of 
recertification. Although phone interviews might be expected to ease recertifica-
tion, Heflin, London, and Mueser (2013) provide evidence that this is not always 
the case. 
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
 
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
 
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
2 
Who Works, Really? 
OVERVIEW 
To examine how rules and administrative practices in the Food 
Stamp Program affect participation and other outcomes among working 
poor households, we need measures of households’ program participa-
tion, measures of the policies and program rules that households face, 
and, especially, measures of households’ work status. Ideally, these 
measures should be as specific, accurate, and complete as possible. For 
example, we want the ability to characterize the particular policies, such 
as recertification dates and work-related time limits, that certain groups 
of households face at a given point in time and examine households’
behavior at those same points in time. 
While it is easy to specify our data needs, it is much harder to find 
data sources that have all the necessary measures or that record these 
measures accurately. Researchers turn to two principal sources. The 
first is information from questionnaire surveys, such as the Current 
Population Survey (CPS), the Survey of Income and Program Participa-
tion (SIPP), and the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). Surveys 
tend to have reliable information on household employment (the CPS is 
the source of monthly U.S. household labor statistics) and demographic 
characteristics. However, survey respondents also tend to underreport 
their participation in public assistance programs, including the Food 
Stamp Program, and to poorly report the timing of program transitions. 
The number of respondents who are at risk of participating in the Food 
Stamp Program is also usually modest, and sample sizes become even 
smaller when particular groups, such as able-bodied adults without 
dependents (ABAWDs), are considered. 
The second general source of information is administrative program 
records. These provide extraordinarily accurate measures of program 
participation and benefit receipt, so they overcome some of the report-
ing problems of survey data. They also contain all the information that 
21 
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is available to caseworkers and program administrators and thus can be 
used to describe the policy context for clients. In addition, administra-
tive records have large numbers of observations—often the universe 
of program participants served by a state agency—and can provide us 
with precise estimates of relationships for narrowly defined groups. At 
the same time, administrative data have drawbacks. The biggest for 
our purposes is that work status, earnings, and income are likely to be 
underreported for strategic or policy reasons. Thus, it can be difficult to 
determine who really works. Other measures, such as education, race, 
and ethnicity, which are not strictly needed for program administration 
but are relevant for an empirical analysis, may be missing or inaccu-
rately recorded. There is also the prosaic issue that administrative case 
records contain sensitive information, require substantial confidential-
ity protections, and are therefore difficult to obtain. 
Of the two sources, administrative case records are better for our 
purposes. We obtain food stamp case records from three states—Geor-
gia, Missouri, and South Carolina—covering fiscal years (FYs) 2001– 
2007, which describe households’ participation, food stamp benefits, 
and other program-related characteristics. In this chapter, we discuss 
the data, explain their strengths and limitations, and describe the ana-
lytical records and measures that we develop from them. 
Although we consider three different states that cover several dif-
ferent policy contexts and economic situations, we recognize that our 
states are not fully representative of all states. To consider how our 
analyses might be affected by the particular selection of states, we com-
pare the measures on program outcomes and household characteristics 
from the states’ administrative data sets to a repeated, cross-section 
sample of administrative records from all states that is available from 
the Food Stamp Program Quality Control (FSPQC) database. 
Also, because of concerns about the reliability of work status infor-
mation in the case records, we link the records to another administrative 
data set—quarterly earnings records from each state’s Unemployment 
Insurance (UI) system—which provides an independent indication of 
work status. The UI earnings records have limitations of their own. For 
example, they do not include earnings from out-of-state employers or 
federal employment, and they overlook certain types of jobs, such as 
some agricultural and domestic work jobs, that UI does not cover. Also, 
the quarterly periodicity of the UI earnings records does not match the 
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monthly periodicity of reported earnings from the food stamp records. 
Nevertheless, the UI earnings records provide valuable information 
about the reliability of the food stamp records. Comparisons of the 
two data sources reveal that work and earnings are substantially under-
reported in the food stamp records. Work appears to be much more com-
mon among food stamp recipients than is indicated in the case records.1 
DATA FROM CASE RECORDS 
As we discussed in Chapter 1, the Food Stamp Program is a federal-
state partnership—the federal government pays the costs of benefits and 
half the cost of administration, and state governments are responsible 
for the remaining administrative costs and the day-to-day operations 
of the program. For our states, the responsible administrative agencies 
are the Georgia Department of Human Services, the Missouri Depart-
ment of Social Services, and the South Carolina Department of Social 
Services. Each of these organizations operates and maintains electronic 
databases for their programs that are used by caseworkers, benefits 
operations, managers, and program officials. The systems record the 
information from initial applications, updates reported to or discovered 
by caseworkers, agency decisions regarding cases, benefits that are 
issued, and other actions. They contain the data that the agencies use to 
determine eligibility, benefit amounts, and program compliance among 
households that ask for assistance. 
These properties make the data incredibly valuable for our analyses. 
Consider the longitudinal participation histories that are the focus of the 
subsequent chapters of this book. Program records identify the precise 
dates that people began and stopped receiving benefits. The data on 
start and stop dates do not rely on people’s memories or cooperation, 
so they are not subject to recall, misreporting, nonresponse, or attri-
tion problems that affect surveys, especially longitudinal surveys (see, 
e.g., Bound, Brown, and Mathiowetz [2001]). The administrative data 
contain similarly accurate information on other program outcomes, 
such as benefit amounts, agency decisions, and special group status. 
They also accurately record the program information that was available 
to the agency and the basis for its actions—for example, the earnings 
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amounts, unearned income amounts, and household size that the agency 
used to determine eligibility and benefits.2 
The administrative systems also contain the universe of cases, so 
there is an enormous number of observations that we can consider. 
The large numbers of observations allow us to consider special policy-
relevant groups yet still generate highly precise estimates. They also 
allow us to disaggregate the records in various ways. In addition, our 
data are available over a relatively long window of seven years, which 
means that we have an unusually large number of complete participa-
tion spells that we can examine. 
The electronic case records also have shortcomings. First, we only 
have records that cover the periods when households are participating 
in the Food Stamp Program. Although we get an accurate count of par-
ticipants and accurate measures of the programmatic characteristics of 
their assistance spells, we do not observe them before or after they par-
ticipate in the Food Stamp Program. In FY 2007, only about two-thirds 
of the people who appeared to be financially eligible to participate in the 
Food Stamp Program actually did so (Leftin and Wolkwitz 2009); the 
use of administrative data does not allow us to examine all of the fac-
tors that contribute to participation. For longitudinal analyses, the data 
allow us to examine the durations of assistance spells and the timing of 
spell exits; however, since we do not have information on the popula-
tion from which food stamp entrants are selected, we cannot study the 
determinants of SNAP entry or the role of prior program participation. 
Second, the measures in the records are limited in scope and do not con-
tain many of the individual or family characteristics that are commonly 
included in surveys, such as health status or family background. Also, 
the quality and availability of some measures that are included in the 
records but not essential to program administration—such as people’s 
education levels, race/ethnicity, and marital status—can be poor, given 
that the caseworkers have very little incentive to verify them. 
Third, clients have some incentives to misreport information. For 
example, reporting extra earnings or income could lead to a loss of ben-
efits or eligibility. Earnings that occur “off the books” or from self-
employment might not be reported to authorities. Careful ethnographic 
studies of disadvantaged families and adults by Edin and Lein (1997) 
and Venkatesh (2006) find that unreported work and underground eco-
nomic activity are common coping strategies. For example, Edin and 
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Lein find that about 40 percent of the welfare-reliant single mothers 
they interviewed engaged in unreported work during the preceding 
year. Overall, approximately 9 percent of the U.S. economy has been 
classified as part of the shadow economy, and such informal economic 
activities are relatively more important in states with more social pro-
gram recipients (Wiseman 2013). 
Even if strategic underreporting was not an issue, the food stamp 
authorities do not necessarily require a full reporting of earnings every 
month. In particular, all three states that we examine used “prospec-
tive reporting” for earnings, which essentially required that clients only 
report jobs that were likely to continue into the next month. Households 
were also only supposed to report reasonably anticipated earnings (e.g., 
they could exclude overtime if it was occasional and unpredictable). At 
different times each of the states had simplified income reporting poli-
cies, in which some types of income or income changes did not need 
to be reported. In South Carolina, for example, clients in the middle of 
a certification period were not required to report changes in income if 
their total incomes were below the gross income threshold of 130 per-
cent of the federal poverty line. 
Finally, there is some ambiguity as to how a case, or food stamp 
unit, is determined. Normally, it is defined as a single person or house-
hold whose members buy and prepare food together. An unrelated indi-
vidual who buys and prepares food separately may be excluded from 
the unit, and such an individual may qualify as a separate unit, whether 
or not the household qualifies. Although regulations limit the extent to 
which related household members can form independent units, in some 
cases the food stamp unit may be formed strategically. Unfortunately, 
we have no information on individuals who are not part of a food stamp 
unit, nor on how units may be related to one another, so we simply take 
them as given and refer to them as households. 
Analysis Files 
From the FY 2001–2007 administrative data for each state’s Food 
Stamp Program, we prepare analysis files by first selecting records for 
each month in which a case (usually a household) received a positive 
amount of food stamp benefits. This leads to an unbalanced panel analy-
sis data set with one observation per case per month of benefit receipt 
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and observations for individual cases linked through case identifiers. 
From the case-level administrative data, we also obtain measures of 
each case’s monthly benefits, reported earned and unearned incomes, 
deductions, and county of residence. We express all dollar-denominated 
values in constant 2007 amounts, using the Consumer Price Index for 
all Urban Consumers (CPI-U). 
The food stamp administrative data also contain records for each 
person (client) who is associated with a case in a given month. We 
use this information to calculate the total number of people in the case 
as well as the age distribution of the members (e.g., the presence and 
number of children, the presence of elderly members). The records also 
indicate one client who is the head or primary informant for the case. 
For this person, we also obtain measures of his/her age, race/ethnicity, 
education, and marital status. 
We drop monthly records for cases in which any of the measures 
of the head’s or household’s characteristics are missing. For all of our 
analyses, we also only consider cases in which there is a head who is at 
least 18 years of age (i.e., we drop “child-only” cases) and no older than 
90.3 One state—Missouri—only provided us with limited quarterly data 
from FY 2001–2003 but provided us with full monthly data afterward. 
Because of this we omit FY 2001–2003 observations from Missouri. To 
make our files more manageable, we randomly selected 1 out of every 
11 cases in each state. Even with this selection, sampling error is so 
small that we focus exclusively on the substantive interpretation of the 
estimates, since differences large enough to be of importance are almost 
always statistically significant. 
Finally, for the analyses in this chapter (but not in our later chap-
ters), we only consider observations for the months of March, June, 
September, and December (the final months of each quarter). The rea-
son for doing this is to align our case record data with other data that 
we will subsequently consider from each state’s UI earnings records.4 
DATA FROM UI EARNINGS RECORDS 
We link the information from the food stamp case records to infor-
mation on quarterly earnings from each state’s UI system. UI benefits 
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are paid to eligible, covered workers who lose their jobs through no 
fault of their own. Eligibility for UI benefits depends on people’s work 
and earnings histories over the five quarters prior to losing their jobs. 
The amount of benefits also depends on the level of earnings. To admin-
ister their UI systems and determine eligibility for both UI benefits and 
actual benefit amounts, states record the quarterly earnings from each 
covered job that a person has. 
For each person in each food stamp case in each quarter, we tally 
all the earnings from all jobs in the UI database. A successful match to 
a UI earnings record indicates that the person worked sometime during 
the quarter; however, the UI record does not indicate precisely when. 
A failure to match to a UI earnings record could indicate one of several 
things. First, it might be the case that the person did not work at all 
during that quarter and thus did not have any earnings. Second, it is 
possible that the person worked but did so in a job that was not covered 
by the UI system, such as domestic work. Third, it is possible that the 
person worked “off the books,” either in an informal position, such as a 
baby-sitter, in an underground or illicit job, or for an employer who did 
not report to the state UI system. Fourth, records can be matched only 
if people’s social security numbers are accurately reported to both the 
food stamp agency and the employer. Edin and Lein (1997) describe 
how public assistance recipients sometimes misreport social security 
numbers to employers to avoid having their earnings detected. Fifth, the 
UI records for Georgia and South Carolina are limited to people who 
work in those states; a person who worked in another state (e.g., a resi-
dent of Rock Hill, South Carolina, who commuted to nearby Charlotte, 
North Carolina) would not have a record in his or her state of residence. 
Because of a data-sharing agreement between Missouri and Kansas, the 
UI records for those two states are merged with Missouri food stamp 
data; however, data are not available for other states. For all these rea-
sons, we must recognize that the UI earnings records understate the 
incidence of work for pay. 
For our analyses, we add the UI earnings for all people in a food 
stamp case together to form a measure of case or household UI earn-
ings. To make these quarterly figures comparable to the monthly reports 
in the food stamp records, we divide the figures by three to obtain a 
monthly equivalent. As with our other dollar-denominated measures, 
we also adjust for inflation using the CPI-U. 
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COMPARISONS WITH THE FOOD STAMP PROGRAM
QUALITY CONTROL DATABASE 
Our initial analyses compare the food stamp administrative case 
records from Georgia, Missouri, and South Carolina with national, 
cross-section administrative data for FY 2001–2007 from the FSPQC 
database. Data in the FSPQC files are obtained through case reviews 
and surveys of a large random sample of food stamp households in 
all states (see Wolkwitz and Ewell [2008]). The underlying data in the 
FSPQC are assembled to determine errors that the states sometimes 
make in their eligibility decisions and benefit awards. Thus, the data 
include nearly all the same measures as the three states’ administrative 
files. Despite the omission of a small number of cases included in state 
files of SNAP recipients, we examine the FSPQC data because they 
contain detailed and cross-validated information about participants, 
including their earnings status.5 The FSPQC data are also the basis for 
annual reports describing the characteristics of food stamp households 
(see, e.g., Wolkwitz and Leftin [2008]). 
Table 2.1 lists average characteristics of food stamp households for 
the United States as a whole (based on data from the FSPQC) in the first 
column and characteristics of households from each of our three analy-
sis states (based on the states’ own administrative data) in the next three 
columns. The FSPQC data come from all months of each year, while the 
individual state administrative data come from end-of-quarter months. 
Additionally, the figures for Missouri only cover FY 2004–2007.6 
The estimates in Table 2.1 indicate that food stamp households in 
the three states we analyze were similar to the nation as a whole in 
terms of their size, the age of the household head, and the average level 
of food stamp benefits. However, there were also some noticeable dif-
ferences. All three of our analysis states had fewer Hispanic recipients, 
fewer elderly recipients, poorer recipients (due mostly to lower lev-
els of unearned income), and higher proportions of recipients with no 
reported case income than the average for the United States. Addition-
ally, Georgia had more households with children and more households 
that reported earnings than other states. Because they had lower over-
all incomes and a higher share of income from earnings, Georgia food 
stamp households also received a higher proportion of their potential 
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Table 2.1 Average Characteristics of Food Stamp Households in the 
United States, Georgia, Missouri, and South Carolina 
United South 
States Georgia Missouri a Carolina 
Demographic characteristics 
Number of people in household 2.3 2.4 2.3 2.4 
Percent with children in household 53.3 61.5 49.4 56.1 
Number of children in household 1.2 1.3 1.0 1.2 
Percent with elderly members 18.1 10.4 14.3 16.2 
Percent with married household head 14.9 17.4 18.3 13.8 
Percent with black household headb 32.2 62.0 31.7 64.3 
Percent with Hispanic household headb 15.7 3.1 1.5 0.4 
Household head’s age 42.5 39.1 40.6 41.8 
Household head’s years of education N.A.c 11.3 11.4 10.8 
Economic characteristics 
Gross monthly income ($) 720 607 623 635 
Gross monthly unearned income ($) 451 292 330 366 
Gross monthly earnings ($) 269 315 293 268 
Gross monthly income as % of poverty 59.1 47.6 51.1 50.7 
Percent with reported earnings 28.8 31.5 28.6 27.6 
Percent with no reported income 12.6 30.2 28.9 20.9 
Area unemployment rated 5.2 5.0 5.8 6.9 
Program characteristics 
Monthly food stamp benefits ($) 214 239 216 223 
Maximum food stamp allotment ($) 321 339 297 334 
Monthly benefits as % of allotment 65.2 70.7 63.2 64.9 
a Data from Missouri only available from FY 2004–2007. 
b Race and ethnicity measures in the FSPQC were redefined in FY 2007; estimates in the 
table are based on FY 2001–2006 data. 
c Education information is missing for many people in the FSPQC database and is not 
considered to be reliable. 
d Total U.S. unemployment rate used in first column; unemployment rate for county of 
residence used in remaining columns. 
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations for the United States from the Food Stamp Program 
Quality Control (FSPQC) database, and authors’ calculations for individual states 
from end-of-quarter administrative records. All dollar estimates have been adjusted 
for inflation to December 2007 values using the Consumer Price Index for Urban 
Consumers. 
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monthly benefits. Georgia and Missouri had more married households 
than the other states, and Georgia and South Carolina had more black 
recipients than other states. Missouri and South Carolina experienced 
higher rates of unemployment than the rest of the country. Thus, each of 
our analysis states had a caseload with some unique demographic and 
economic characteristics. 
We can also compare trends in the percentage of the food stamp 
households that reported receiving earnings (and thus working) in our 
three analysis states and the United States as a whole. The relevant fig-
ures are listed in Table 2.2. As we discussed in the previous chapter, 
the percentage of food stamp households in the United States reporting 
earnings steadily rose from 27.0 percent in FY 2001 to 29.8 percent in 
FY 2007. Although Georgia had higher percentages of households with 
earnings than the rest of the country and South Carolina had slightly 
lower percentages, trends in both states were upward. In contrast, the 
data for Missouri, which are only available for FY 2004–2007, show no 
discernible trend. 
COMPARISONS OF FOOD STAMP REPORTED EARNINGS
AND UI EARNINGS 
Earnings information in the food stamp administrative records 
is recorded on a monthly basis, while earnings information in the UI 
administrative databases is recorded quarterly. To make comparisons 
between the two systems as meaningful as possible, we restrict our end-
of-quarter observations from the food stamp administrative records to 
cases that had participated for three consecutive months and thus that 
had an entire quarter of earnings information. 
Food stamp households in our three analysis states report their earn-
ings to their state agencies prospectively. Changes in earnings could 
occur after a household has already received its monthly benefits. To 
reduce the possible influence of households that experience such earn-
ings boosts, we further restrict our analysis to end-of-quarter cases that 
continued receiving food stamp benefits for at least the first month of 
the subsequent quarter. Restricting the analysis sample to cases that had 
participated for all three months of a given quarter and at least the first 
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Table 2.2  Trends in the Percentage of Food Stamp Households 
Reporting Earnings in the United States, Georgia, Missouri, 
and South Carolina 
Fiscal year United States Georgia Missouri a South Carolina 
2001 27.0 30.3 26.0 
2002 28.0 29.5 26.3 
2003 28.2 30.7 27.3 
2004 28.8 31.3 28.0 27.8 
2005 29.3 31.8 29.2 28.1 
2006 29.7 32.0 28.7 28.3 
2007 29.8 32.6 28.4 28.3 
a Data from Missouri only available from FY 2004–2007. 
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations for the United States from the Food Stamp Program 
Quality Control database, and authors’ calculations for individual states from end-of-
quarter administrative records. 
month of the next quarter results in a sample that is slightly more dis-
advantaged than the sample used in Tables 2.1 and 2.2. However, the 
restrictions do not have a substantial effect on our findings. 
Quarterly earnings that were reported to food stamp agencies in our 
three states and from the UI databases were highly, though imperfectly, 
correlated. In Georgia, the correlation between earnings amounts was 
0.57; in Missouri, 0.63; and in South Carolina, 0.67. 
Table 2.3 compares the incidence of earnings reported to food 
stamp agencies and those reported to the UI system in our three analysis 
states. The vast majority of earnings incidence reports agreed. In Geor-
gia, 77.7 percent of the reports agreed, with 52.5 percent of households 
reporting no earnings to both the food stamp agency and UI system, and 
25.2 percent reporting some earnings to both systems. In Missouri and 
South Carolina, 81.5 percent and 80 percent of the incidence reports 
agreed, respectively. 
In all three states, there were also substantial fractions of house-
holds—10 percent in Georgia, 5.2 percent in Missouri, and 5.7 percent 
in South Carolina—that reported earnings to food stamp agencies but 
that had no earnings recorded in the UI system. Some of these house-
holds may have had members who worked out of state and who had 
earnings recorded in another state’s UI system. Other households may 
have had members working in uncovered jobs. In some cases, house-
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
32 Mueser, Ribar, and Tekin 
Table 2.3  Comparisons of Quarterly Earnings Reports from Food Stamp 
and UI Records (%) 
South 
Georgia Missouria Carolina 
No earnings reported to food stamp 52.5 58.9 56.3 
agency or UI 
Earnings reported to food stamp agency 25.2 22.6 23.7 
and UI 
Earnings reported to food stamp agency 10.0 5.2 5.7 
but not to UI 
Earnings reported to UI but not to food 12.3 13.3 14.3 
stamp agency 
a Data from Missouri only available from FY 2004–2007. 
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from end-of-quarter food stamp administrative records 
for households that received benefits for all three months of the quarter and for the 
first month of the subsequent quarter matched to UI earnings records. 
holds may have reported future expected earnings for jobs that ended 
prior to the quarter in which the employer reported earnings. 
There were also sizable fractions of households—12.3 percent in 
Georgia, 13.3 percent in Missouri, and 14.3 percent in South Caro-
lina—that had recorded earnings in their state’s UI systems but who did 
not report any earnings to food stamp agencies. In some cases, these 
earnings may have been from short, temporary, or irregular jobs or from 
permanent opportunities that did not work out. If the job was unantici-
pated and if it did not last beyond the month, the state might not have 
required the job to be included in the household’s prospective earnings. 
In other cases, however, it is possible that either the households or case-
workers failed to properly report incomes. Indeed, the quality control 
process estimated that the cumulative food stamp overpayment error 
rates (errors that included underreported earnings but also other things) 
from FY 2001 to 2007 ranged from 4.0 to 7.2 percent in Georgia, 2.0 to 
8.1 percent in Missouri, and 3.4 to 5.5 percent in South Carolina.7 
The results from Table 2.3 indicate that neither the records in the 
state UI systems nor the reports made directly to food stamp agencies 
capture the full extent of work among food stamp households. Although 
about a quarter to a third of the households in our three states report 
working for pay to food stamp agencies in a given quarter, the incidence 
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Who Works, Really?  33 
of work is at least 12–14 percentage points higher than that. Thus, the 
actual fraction of working food stamp households may be close to one 
half. 
Sanctioned or not, the apparent underreporting of earnings in the 
food stamp system leads to questions regarding which types of house-
holds are more likely to make different types of reports. Table 2.4 lists 
the average characteristics of households in each of our analysis states 
that did or did not report earnings to the food stamp agencies and to 
their state’s UI system. Households that did not report earnings to either 
system tended to have fewer members, be less likely to have children, 
be older, be less likely to be married, and have larger unearned incomes 
than other households. In contrast, households that reported earnings 
to both systems tended to have more members, be more likely to have 
children, be younger, have lower levels of unearned income, and receive 
lower proportions of their maximum food stamp allotments than other 
households. Comparisons of the reported earnings amounts reveal that 
these households reported about $130–$170 more in average monthly 
earnings to their state’s UI systems than to the food stamp agencies. The 
differences in these amounts might be consistent with states’ income 
reporting requirements, but they could also reflect purposeful, unau-
thorized underreporting. 
Households that reported earnings to their state’s food stamp agency 
but that did not have reported earnings in their state’s UI system looked 
similar in many respects to households with indications of earnings in 
both systems. The principal differences between the two groups were 
that households with no indications of earnings in the UI system tended 
to be less likely to be black and to have lower reported earnings. In 
Georgia and South Carolina, these households were also more likely to 
be Hispanic and more likely to live in a border county. The differences 
for Hispanics could be attributable to their overrepresentation in agri-
cultural work and other uncovered jobs. The differences between resi-
dents in border and nonborder counties for Georgia and South Carolina 
might reflect differences in the chances of working out of state.8 
Households with reported earnings in their state’s UI systems but 
with no earnings reported to food stamp agencies were less likely to be 
married, more likely to be black, had higher average unearned incomes, 
and received higher proportions of their maximum food stamp allot-
ments than households that reported earnings. The average monthly 
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earnings recorded in the UI system for these households was just over 
$600 in each state, which was lower than the UI earnings for house-
holds that reported earnings to food stamp agencies. To put the figure 
in perspective, it was the equivalent of just under three weeks of full-
time work at the then-prevailing federal minimum wage. Among house-
holds with UI earnings but no reported food stamp earnings, very high 
proportions—48.2 percent in Georgia, 45.5 percent in Missouri, and 
36.3 percent in South Carolina—also reported not having any unearned 
income. 
Table 2.4 reports average characteristics that condition on house-
holds’ income reporting behavior but not on other characteristics. We 
have also estimated (but do not report detailed results from) multivari-
ate unordered discrete choice (multinomial logit) models that account 
for indirect associations among the measured characteristics. All the 
simple differences described in the preceding text also appear in the 
multivariate models. 
As we did with the national FSPQC data, we can also compare 
trends in food stamp households’ indicated work behavior based on their 
reports to state food stamp agencies and based on records from the state 
UI systems. Table 2.5 lists these results. Trends in the incidence and 
monthly equivalent amounts of earnings are mostly similar for the data 
reported to food stamp agencies and to the UI system, although there 
are a few exceptions. For example, the incidence of earnings reported 
to the Georgia Department of Human Services generally increased from 
FY 2001 to 2007, while the incidence of earnings in the state’s UI sys-
tem fell from FY 2001 to 2002 but increased thereafter. Comparisons 
of the estimated incidence of earnings reported to food stamp agencies 
from Table 2.2 and Table 2.5 further indicate that restricting the end-of-
quarter administrative data to cases that participated in all three months 
of the quarter and in the first month of the subsequent quarter does not 
substantially alter the trends. 
Table 2.5 also lists the average differences in the earnings amounts 
reported to food stamp agencies and to the UI system first in terms 
of monthly equivalents and second as a proportion of each house-
hold’s gross-income food stamp eligibility threshold (i.e., 130 percent 
of the federal poverty line). In Georgia, the average differences in the 
reported amounts are very modest, ranging from $27 to $45 in monthly 
terms over the period. In Missouri and South Carolina, the differences 
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Table 2.4  Characteristics of Food Stamp Households Conditional on Earnings Reports 
Georgia Missouria South Carolina 
No FS, FS and FS but UI but No FS, FS and FS but UI but No FS, FS and FS but UI but 
Earnings report by source no UI UI no UI no FS no UI UI no UI no FS no UI UI no UI no FS 
Demographic characteristics 
No. of people in household 2.0 3.3 2.9 2.7 1.6 3.3 2.7 2.5 1.9 3.4 2.8 2.8 
% with children in HH 43.3 89.8 82.4 72.9 27.2 83.5 62.1 62.2 37.6 88.7 68.3 71.4 
No. of children in HH 0.9 2.1 1.8 1.5 0.5 1.9 1.4 1.2 0.7 2.0 1.5 1.5 
% with elderly members 19.6 1.2 2.6 3.9 28.7 1.3 6.6 4.1 29.1 1.4 4.1 4.3 
% with married HH head 16.6 27.0 32.8 18.3 14.1 23.8 25.6 16.3 10.7 17.9 23.1 12.2 
% with black HH head 59.9 67.6 48.5 72.9 29.7 28.2 21.7 42.2 62.9 70.8 53.7 71.5 
% with Hisp. HH head 1.8 2.7 12.0 1.5 1.1 1.9 1.4 1.9 0.2 0.5 1.5 0.3 
Household head’s age 44.9 32.6 34.2 35.7 49.0 32.1 37.7 35.5 48.7 33.2 37.1 35.6 
HH head’s years of educ. 11.1 11.6 11.3 11.5 11.1 11.7 11.6 11.6 10.1 11.6 11.2 11.4 
Economic characteristics 
Monthly unearned income ($) 423 126 127 294 494 135 243 329 509 147 146 361 
Mthly. earnings rep. to FS ($) 0 950 672 0 0 995 577 0 0 944 539 0 
Monthly earn. rep. to UI ($) 0 1,082 0 602 0 1,164 0 601 0 1,097 0 632 
% with no reported inc. 33.8 0.0 0.0 48.2 26.6 0.0 0.0 45.5 20.9 0.0 0.0 36.3 
Area unemployment rate (%) 5.1 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.8 5.6 5.6 5.9 7.0 6.7 7.0 6.8 
Border county (%) 26.7 28.3 29.2 23.7 66.4 63.0 60.2 72.5 42.7 38.9 44.9 40.9 
Program characteristics 
Monthly FS benefits ($) 213 275 291 314 157 276 264 289 183 267 285 318 
Maximum FS allotment ($) 279 446 401 366 226 416 350 328 272 453 380 380 
Monthly ben. as % of allot. 73.0 62.5 74.4 86.4 55.9 59.4 64.7 78.2 61.7 59.5 77.4 84.5 
NOTE: FS = food stamps; UI = Unemployment Insurance; HH = household. 
a Data from Missouri only available from FY 2004–2007. 
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from end-of-quarter food stamp administrative records for households that received benefits for all three 
months of the quarter and for the first month of the subsequent quarter matched to UI earnings records. All dollar estimates have been 




36  Table 2.5  Trends in Earnings Reported to Food Stamp Agencies and UI System 
Average difference 
Average difference between reported 
Average monthly between amounts amounts as a 
Percent of Average monthly Percent of amount of earnings reported to FS percentage of 
households amount of earnings households with reported in UI agency and UI gross-income elig. 
reporting earnings reported to FS earnings in UI system systema threshold 
Fiscal year to FS agency (%) agency ($) system (%) ($) (%) (%) 
Georgia 
2001 33 279 38 309 30 3 
2002 33 280 36 307 27 2 
2003 35 305 37 335 30 2 
2004 35 304 37 345 41 3 
2005 36 313 38 358 45 3 
2006 36 313 38 358 45 3 
2007 36 313 38 358 45 3 
Missourib 
2004 28 254 37 350 96 6 
2005 28 260 37 355 95 6 
2006 28 252 35 333 81 5 
2007 27 252 34 330 77 5 
South Carolina 
2001 28 240 35 299 60 3 
2002 28 248 36 319 70 4 
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2003 29 257 37 345 89 5 
2004 30 256 38 360 103 6 
2005 30 259 39 373 114 7 
2006 30 257 39 366 109 7 
2007 30 259 39 364 105 6 
a Differences in column may not equal the differences in previous columns due to rounding. 
b Data from Missouri only available from FY 2004–2007. 
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from end-of-quarter food stamp administrative records for households that received benefits for all three 
months of the quarter and for the first month of the subsequent quarter matched to UI earnings records. All dollar estimates have been 
adjusted for inflation to December 2007 values using the Consumer Price Index for Urban Consumers. 
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between the reported amounts are more substantial, exceeding $100 in 
monthly equivalent terms in South Carolina in several years. However, 
when expressed as a proportion of the gross-income eligibility thresh-
old, the differences in reported earnings are all very modest. In Geor-
gia, the differences are only 2–3 percent of the gross-income threshold, 
while in Missouri and South Carolina the differences range from 3 to 
7 percent of the threshold. These differences suggest that the apparent 
underreporting of earnings to state food stamp agencies has relatively 
modest effects on eligibility and benefits. 
IMPLICATIONS 
In the subsequent chapters, we use longitudinal administrative data 
from the Georgia, Missouri, and South Carolina Food Stamp Programs 
to investigate how changes in work-related policies affect the length of 
households’ food stamp participation spells and the timing of house-
holds’ exits from assistance. Administrative data have some advantages 
for these purposes—they accurately record the start and stop dates of 
spells, record all of the information available to the agencies and case 
managers, and contain many more observations than are typically avail-
able in surveys. However, administrative data are also generally under-
stood to have drawbacks, and the analyses in this chapter confirm that 
some of these drawbacks are present in our data. 
Representativeness 
Because of confidentiality concerns and the sensitivity of the under-
lying information, special arrangements need to be made to work with 
case record data. We were fortunate to be able to make such arrange-
ments with state agencies in three states, which allows us to examine 
policy changes in several contexts. However, we acknowledge that the 
three states that we analyze are not representative of all states. Over the 
period that we consider, food stamp households in Georgia, Missouri, 
and South Carolina were similar to food stamp households across the 
nation in terms of their sizes, reported earnings, and potential maximum 
food stamp benefits. However, households in our analysis states were 
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also poorer than households in the United States as a whole, owing 
mainly to lower unearned incomes and less generous cash assistance 
policies in the analysis states. Households in our analysis states were 
less likely to have elderly members and less likely to be Hispanic. Also, 
our two southern states—Georgia and South Carolina—had much 
higher proportions of black households than the rest of the country. 
In the empirical analyses in the subsequent chapters, we use mul-
tivariate statistical techniques that condition on observed characteris-
tics of households, including their unearned incomes, age composition, 
race, and ethnicity. Still the results should be interpreted as being rep-
resentative of households in states with less generous cash assistance 
programs and not necessarily of households with access to more gener-
ous programs. 
Underreported Earnings 
Administrative data precisely record households’ participation in 
the Food Stamp Program, the benefits households received, the policy 
conditions that they faced, and the information that served as the basis 
for program outcomes. However, the data provide a much less accurate 
picture of households’ work behavior and earnings. 
All three of our analysis states computed households’ food stamp 
eligibility and benefits for a given issue month on the basis of “pro-
spective budgeting,” which means using income and resource amounts 
that could be reasonably anticipated for the month. Households with 
highly variable pay or hours and households with unanticipated earn-
ings shocks would have received earnings that differed from those used 
in the calculations and recorded in the administrative data. Each of the 
states also adopted simplified income reporting procedures that meant 
that some types of earnings increases did not have to be reported to food 
stamp agencies during a household’s certification period. Beyond these 
sanctioned reasons for reporting different incomes than were actually 
received, households had incentives to conceal earnings from the food 
stamp agencies. 
We compared the earnings reported to the food stamp agencies to 
the earnings reported to each state’s Unemployment Insurance system. 
The UI systems are themselves incomplete and fail to record all the 
income earned by households in each state. Despite this, the incidence 
 
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
  
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
  
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
40 Mueser, Ribar, and Tekin 
and amounts of earnings recorded for our food stamp households in 
the UI system were each higher than those recorded by the food stamp 
agencies. For example, a quarter to a third of the food stamp house-
holds that we examined reported earnings to food stamp agencies, but 
a further 12–14 percent with no earnings in the food stamp records had 
reported earnings in the UI records. Depending on the state and year, 
the average monthly value of earnings reported by households to food 
stamp agencies was $30–$114 less than the amount recorded in the UI 
system. Among households that reported no earnings to food stamp 
authorities but that had reported earnings in the UI system, the aver-
age monthly value of those UI earnings exceeded $600. Thus, work 
among food stamp households is more widespread and remunerative 
than agencies’ records indicate. 
The empirical analyses of participation outcomes in our subsequent 
chapters will utilize only the earnings data reported to food stamp agen-
cies. Although the UI earnings data are available, we do not include 
them for two reasons. First, the data in the food stamp agency records 
were the data that were used to set the policies that we are interested 
in, including the length of recertification intervals and the applicabil-
ity of ABAWD time limits. Second, the quarterly periodicity of the UI 
earnings information is different from and difficult to align with the 
monthly periodicity of the food stamp participation outcomes and data. 
In interpreting the results, however, it is important to note the distinc-
tion between households’ reported and actual earnings behavior. 
Notes 
1. As discussed below, SNAP administrative practice records expected future earn-
ings for use in calculating SNAP eligibility and benefits, so observed discrepan-
cies may not be due to misreporting by participants. 
2. The sources of countable unearned income are regular cash payments except for 
earnings. These include cash transfers from other government programs, such as 
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families benefits, Unemployment Insurance pay-
ments, Supplemental Security Income benefits, and Social Security retirement and 
disability insurance payments. They also include private sources of income, such 
as pensions, private disability payments, and child support. Countable income 
does not include some irregular sources of income, such as Earned Income Tax 
Credit payments. It also does not include other in-kind assistance, such as Medi-
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3. The exclusions for item nonresponse and for very young and very old household 
heads reduce the analysis samples for each state by only a few percentage points. 
4. The estimates that we report for the end-of-quarter months are similar to estimates 
using all months. 
5. As noted in Chapter 1, the FSPQC data exclude a modest number of cases, such 
as households receiving disaster assistance and recipients facing case closures but 
appealing those decisions. See U.S. Department of Agriculture, Food and Nutrition 
Service, “Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program Participation and Costs.” 
http://www.fns.usda.gov/sites/default/files/pd/SNAPsummary.pdf (accessed May 
14, 2014). 
6. In separate analyses not shown, we compared the administrative data for Geor-
gia, Missouri, and South Carolina with the FSPQC data for those specific states 
and confirmed that each data source provided similar estimates of household 
characteristics. 
7. U.S. Department of Agriculture, Food and Nutrition Service, “Supplemental 
Nutrition Assistance Program Quality Control.” http://www.fns.usda.gov/snap/qc/ 
(accessed May 14, 2014). Error rates beginning in FY 2003 can be found at http:// 
fns.usda.gov/snap/qc/ (accessed December 20, 2018). 
8. We do not observe the same relationship in Missouri between residence in a bor-
der county and the incidence of UI earnings. Recall that UI earnings data are 
available for people who work in Kansas. This would reduce the “border effect” 
for Kansas City metropolitan area residents who are in Missouri counties on the 
border with Kansas. In the case of the St. Louis metropolitan area, which is on the 
Illinois border, job opportunities are much greater in the Missouri portion of the 
metropolitan area, so relatively few Missouri residents commute across the border 
to jobs in Illinois. 
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Food Stamp Recertification 
Intervals and the Working Poor 
We expect that the working poor would find the administrative 
requirements for obtaining and maintaining SNAP eligibility to be par-
ticularly burdensome. Beyond the time and effort of pulling together 
materials, the need to visit or call a state office at a specific time could 
present an important obstacle. In addition, employed food stamp recipi-
ents are generally required to submit documents for recertification more 
frequently than those without employment. For these reasons, recerti-
fication policies are particularly important for the working poor. This 
chapter focuses on those policies and their variation over time in Geor-
gia, Missouri, and South Carolina, documenting their role in inducing 
attrition from the Food Stamp Program. 
A household’s eligibility to participate in the Food Stamp Pro-
gram is based on monthly criteria. In principle, the states that admin-
ister the Food Stamp Program could check these criteria every month 
for every participating household and require the households to report 
their incomes and assets and provide supporting documentation. Such 
a policy would allow for highly accurate eligibility and benefits deter-
minations, but it would also be terribly burdensome for the clients who 
would have to provide the materials and costly for the states that would 
have to process, review, and act on the information. 
Instead of requiring this information every month, states certify 
eligibility for most clients for several months—and in some cases up 
to two years—at a time. During these certification periods, clients 
receive food stamp benefits and generally do not have to report about 
their household or financial circumstances unless there is some type of 
relevant change. At the end of the certification period, the household 
must have its eligibility for assistance recertified and its benefits re-
determined. Recertification typically involves supplying the same infor-
mation as in the original application. If the household fails to recertify, 
its benefits are terminated. 
43 
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States are given some discretion in setting the length of certification 
periods. States typically set longer certification periods for households 
with incomes that come only from fixed sources, such as retirement and 
disability payments, and in some cases welfare. The logic behind this 
choice is that these sources of income either do not change much over 
time (so there is nothing new to report) or are already tracked through 
other state administrative systems (so eligibility can be confirmed auto-
matically). States set shorter periods for households with earnings and 
other sources of income that are more likely to fluctuate. While this dis-
tinction makes sense from a reporting and information standpoint, it has 
the perverse practical effects of raising the costs of program compliance 
for households with working members and discouraging participation 
among these households. More frequent recertifications also increase 
the risk that a household will be dropped from the program because 
of carelessness or if an emergency or some other event interferes with 
completing this task, which would also reduce participation among 
working households. This chapter empirically examines whether the 
lengths of recertification intervals influence food stamp participation 
patterns and whether differences in those intervals explain some of the 
difference in food stamp participation between working and nonwork-
ing households. 
States differ in the ways in which they set certification periods. 
Some states instruct caseworkers to assign periods that last up to a cer-
tain length but give caseworkers flexibility to set the period within that 
length. This kind of flexibility can be helpful to clients who participate 
in multiple assistance programs that also have certification periods; in 
some circumstances, the caseworkers can schedule the ends of the cer-
tification periods for the different programs so that they fall on the same 
date. Other states, including the three that we study, have had policies 
where certification periods for particular types of clients must be a cer-
tain length. These policies confer an analytical advantage because all 
clients of a given type are subject to recertification at regular, identifi-
able intervals. 
Other studies have focused on the effects of recertification intervals. 
A common approach in the empirical literature has been to use informa-
tion on the difference in recertification intervals across states or type of 
household within a state to examine how these are related to caseloads. 
For example, Currie and Grogger (2001) investigate how the average 
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frequency of recertifications in a state was associated with food stamp 
receipt. They find that longer average intervals were associated with 
higher rates of participation for most types of households but that few 
of the estimates could be statistically distinguished from zero. Korn-
feld (2002) also finds that recertification intervals were associated with 
participation for some types of households, such as households with 
multiple adults and children and childless households with nonelderly 
members, but not others. Kabbani and Wilde (2003) find stronger evi-
dence of participation effects, estimating that participation rates were 
as much as 2.4 percent lower in states with short (monthly to quarterly) 
recertification requirements than in states with longer certification 
intervals. In contrast, Ratcliffe, McKernan, and Finegold (2008) find 
much less consistent evidence. They report that longer recertification 
intervals were associated with increased participation for households 
with children but decreased participation for able-bodied adults without 
dependents (ABAWDs). 
Other research has examined how recertification affects the timing 
of families’ exits from the Food Stamp Program. Staveley, Stevens, and 
Wilde (2002) conduct a descriptive analysis of administrative data from 
Maryland and find that program exits were clustered at likely recertifi-
cation dates. Ribar, Edelhoch, and Liu (2008) provide descriptive evi-
dence and estimate multivariate models using administrative data from 
South Carolina and find similar results. Gray (2018) also shows that 
attrition from Michigan’s Food Stamp Program over the period 2005– 
2011 occurred disproportionately in months when recertification was 
required. His analyses in six other states for 2011–2012 find essentially 
the same pattern of attrition. 
In this chapter, we follow the approach of these latter studies and 
take advantage of the regularities in recertification policies to examine 
how the length of certification periods affects the length of time that 
households remain on the Food Stamp Program. We use case records 
for households with working-age members from Georgia, Missouri, 
and South Carolina that provide information on the duration of pro-
gram spells, and we empirically examine how the timing of program 
exits relates to the timing of recertification dates. Our analyses reveal 
that households were several times more likely to leave the Food Stamp 
Program when recertifications were due than at other times. The analy-
ses also show that shorter recertification intervals, which were com-
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monly assigned to working households, were associated with shorter 
program spells. 
RECERTIFICATION POLICIES IN GEORGIA, MISSOURI,
AND SOUTH CAROLINA 
Table 3.1 summarizes the recertification policies from 2001 through 
2007 for Georgia, Missouri, and South Carolina. All three states had 
different recertification policies for different types of households, and 
all three also changed their policies over the period that we study. 
Georgia’s recertification policies are listed in the first row of Table 
3.1. Prior to October 2002, Georgia required all nonelderly, nondisabled 
food stamp participants to recertify every 3 months and households 
with elderly or disabled members (and presumably fixed incomes) to 
recertify every 12 months. Starting in October 2002, the state increased 
the recertification intervals for nonelderly, nondisabled, non-ABAWD 
households to 6 months, but maintained the quarterly intervals for 
ABAWD households and the annual intervals for households with 
elderly and disabled members. 
Missouri and South Carolina also set different recertification inter-
vals for different types of food stamp households. In Missouri, most 
households without elderly and disabled members were initially 
required to recertify every three months; however, beginning in April 
2003, the recertification intervals increased to six months. Households 
with nonworking elderly and disabled members had the same formal 
certification periods but could be recertified with much less information 
for up to 24 months. Missouri also set very short recertification inter-
vals, ranging from 1 to 3 months, for households with very unstable 
circumstances, such as households with migrant workers. 
South Carolina initially set recertification intervals of 3 months for 
households with fluctuating incomes and recertification intervals of 12 
months for households with fixed sources of income. As with Missouri, 
South Carolina also had relaxed recertification requirements for house-
holds with nonworking elderly and disabled members and set very 
short intervals for households with unusually unstable circumstances. 
In October 2002, South Carolina increased the recertification interval 
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d, (e.g., migrant 
workers) 
Georgia Before Oct. 2002: 
3 months 
Before Oct. 2002: 
3 months 
3 months 12 months 
After Oct. 2002: After Oct. 2002: 
6 months 6 months 
Missouri Before Apr. 2003: 
3 months 
Before Apr. 2003: 
3 months 
Treated like other 
households 
Treated like other 
households but 
1–3 months 
After Apr. 2003: 
6 months 
After Apr. 2003: 
6 months 
with less formal 
reporting for up 
to 24 months 
South Carolina Before Oct. 2002: Before Feb. 2005: Treated like other Treated like other 1–2 months 
3 months 12 months households households but 
After Oct. 2002: After Feb. 2005: with less formal 
6 months 6 months reporting for up 
to 24 months 
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for households with fluctuating incomes from 3 months to 6 months, 
and in February 2005, the state reduced the recertification interval for 
households that relied solely on unearned income from 12 to 6 months. 
In all three states, the increases in recertification intervals from 3 
to 6 months would be expected to increase the length of food stamp 
spells and contribute to an increase in the food stamp caseload, other 
things held constant. In South Carolina, the decrease in recertification 
intervals from 12 to 6 months in 2005 for households without earnings 
would be expected to shorten food stamp spells and reduce the case-
load for that group. Also, the shorter recertification intervals for house-
holds with earned income is expected to reduce spell lengths and reduce 




As we describe in the previous chapter, we use the administrative 
data from Georgia, Missouri, and South Carolina to form state-specific 
analysis files that each contain one observation per household per 
month of food stamp benefit receipt. These observations include infor-
mation about the household’s program benefits, its earned and unearned 
income, its composition, its head’s characteristics, and its economic and 
geographic circumstances each month. 
For the empirical analyses in this chapter, we further organize these 
monthly observations into participation spells, which consist of months 
of consecutive food stamp receipt. For each monthly observation within 
a spell, we measure the duration, which describes the number of months 
since the spell began. We distinguish between spells that are observed 
to their end and for which we observe an exit and “right-censored” 
spells, which are not observed to their end because they were ongoing 
when our observation window closed at the end of FY 2007 or were 
on-going when we stopped tracking the household because of missing 
information. We also drop “left-censored” spells, which were ongoing 
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when our observation window began and for which we cannot deter-
mine spell durations. 
In the data, a substantial number of participation spells last one 
month. Many of these spells are for households that temporarily received 
food stamp benefits while their applications were being considered but 
that were subsequently determined to be ineligible for assistance. There 
are also many participation spells that are separated by a single month 
of nonparticipation. This frequently occurs when a household misses 
its recertification but upon losing its benefits immediately completes 
its recertification and resumes its participation spell. As is customary 
in event-history analyses of public assistance spells (see, e.g., Blank 
and Ruggles [1996]; Gleason, Schochet, and Moffitt [1998]; and Ribar, 
Edelhoch, and Liu [2008]), we smooth the data by dropping one-month 
participation spells and by eliminating one-month breaks in participa-
tion spells. 
We drop spells for food stamp households in which all the members 
were elderly because the incidence of work for these households was 
miniscule. In all our analyses we also distinguish between households 
with and without children, owing to the differences in work behavior, 
some program rules, and the availability of other types of assistance for 
these groups. 
Estimation Approach 
The statistical approach that we use to examine the effects of recer-
tification policies on food stamp participation is discrete-time hazard 
analysis (see Alison [1982] for a thorough technical description). In 
general, hazard analyses are used to examine the length of time that 
someone spends in one condition before transitioning to some other 
condition. In our case, we use the approach to investigate the length of 
time that a household receives food stamps from the month it begins 
receiving benefits until the month it stops receiving benefits. The analy-
sis is framed in terms of discrete-time hazards, which are the probabili-
ties of transitioning out of the initial status (leaving food stamps) con-
ditional on having been in that status (receiving food stamps) up to that 
point. Hazard methods were originally developed to study mortality, 
and an example from that is the probability that someone dies at age 70 
conditional on the person living to age 70.1 
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The term discrete-time refers to the fact that the time in the condi-
tion is measured in countable (integer) units. Food stamp benefits in the 
three states in our study were generally issued monthly. Thus, we count 
people as participating in the Food Stamp Program if they received ben-
efits in a given month, and we record the length of their participation 
spells in terms of the number of months that they received benefits. 
A key advantage of hazard analyses is that they show how peo-
ple’s chances of leaving the Food Stamp Program change with each 
month spent on the program. Thus, the analysis can show months when 
people are very likely to leave. This is extraordinarily helpful in look-
ing at recertification policies because they are tied to specific months 
of program experience. For example, someone who is subject to quar-
terly recertifications would encounter this policy at the end of the third 
month on the program, sixth month on the program, ninth month, and 
so on, but not in other months. If recertifications (distinct from other 
events) cause some people to leave the Food Stamp Program, we would 
expect to see elevated hazard probabilities in these specific months. 
We conduct descriptive and multivariate analyses. In the descrip-
tive analyses, we calculate Kaplan-Meier hazard estimates for each 
month of the food stamp spell, providing the observed probability that 
individuals exit SNAP conditional on receiving SNAP up to that point, 
comparing people who begin their spells with and without earnings in 
each state under different recertification regimes. In addition, we esti-
mate multivariate models that also examine the relationship between 
program exits and recertification policies but that control for household 
characteristics, economic conditions, and other observed measures. 
The estimated hazard probabilities can also be used to calculate the 
probabilities that spells will continue past specified dates; statisticians 
call these survival probabilities. Thus, we can form distributions of the 
probabilities that spells will last at least one month, at least two months, 
at least three months, and so on.2 From these distributions, we can cal-
culate the median spell length (the spell duration by which half of the 
recipients will have exited and half of the recipients will remain on the 
program). In the analyses that follow, we also examine how median 
spell lengths in the states change with recertification policies and other 
household characteristics. 
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DESCRIPTIVE RESULTS 
Timing of Exits 
Figure 3.1 contains four panels depicting Kaplan-Meier estimates 
of the monthly hazard probabilities of leaving the Food Stamp Pro-
gram over the first 30 months of participation spells for different groups 
of households in Georgia. The first two panels show estimated haz-
ard probabilities for households that include children, while the next 
two panels show estimated hazard probabilities for childless house-
holds with nonelderly (working-age) adults. The panels are further 
organized by the dates when the households entered the Food Stamp 
Program. The first and third panels show estimates for the cohort of 
households that entered before October 2002—that is, during the period 
when Georgia required quarterly recertifications for most nonelderly, 
nondisabled households. The second and fourth panels show estimates 
from the cohort of households that entered on or after October 2002, 
when the state switched to semiannual recertifications for non-ABAWD 
households. 
The sawtooth pattern in the hazard estimates indicates that the tim-
ing of Food Stamp Program exits in Georgia was strongly related to the 
timing of recertifications. Among food stamp households with children, 
exits were several times more likely to occur at quarterly recertification 
dates prior to October 2002. After October 2002, the quarterly spikes 
disappeared, and households were instead much more likely to leave 
at semiannual intervals. Among childless, nonelderly households there 
was also a substantially higher probability of leaving the Food Stamp 
Program at quarterly intervals prior to October 2002. After October 
2002, there continued to be high probabilities of exiting the program 
at quarterly and semiannual intervals, though the semiannual spikes 
became relatively larger. The estimates after October 2002 for child-
less, nonelderly households are consistent with this group containing a 
mix of ABAWD households, who would have been subject to quarterly 
recertifications, and non-ABAWD households (e.g., households with 
disabled members or members between 50 and 60 years of age), who 
would have been subject to semiannual recertifications. Taken together, 
the estimates from Figure 3.1 provide very strong evidence that Geor-
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Georgia households without children that began spells before October 2002 
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Georgia households without children that began spells on or after October 2002 
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SOURCE: Authors’ calculations of Kaplan-Meier hazard probabilities from Georgia 
administrative data. 
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gia’s recertification policies influenced food stamp households’ partici-
pation behavior through the timing of exits. 
In Figure 3.2, we conduct a similar analysis for food stamp 
households in Missouri. As with the previous figure, Figure 3.2 
shows Kaplan-Meier hazard estimates for households with children 
first and nonelderly households without children next. Monthly data 
on food stamp spells in Missouri were only available starting in FY
2004, so the panels show estimates for households that entered the 
state’s Food Stamp Program after it had adopted longer recertifi-
cation intervals and most households were subject to semiannual
recertifications. 
Food stamp households’ exit behavior in Missouri exhibited the 
sawtooth pattern that we observed in Georgia. Specifically, households 
were much more likely to leave the program at semiannual intervals but 
not in other periods, which was consistent with the recertification policy 
that was in effect at the time. 
Figure 3.3 shows Kaplan-Meier hazard probabilities estimated for 
households with children and nonelderly households without children 
who entered the Food Stamp Program in South Carolina during three 
different time intervals: October 2000–March 2001, July 2002–Decem-
ber 2002, and April 2005–September 2005. These time intervals cor-
respond to the three different recertification policy periods in South 
Carolina. 
South Carolina’s initial recertification policies differed from those 
of the other two states because South Carolina distinguished between 
households with fluctuating and fixed incomes. In the first and fourth 
panels, South Carolina households were more likely to leave the Food 
Stamp Program at quarterly and annual intervals. The quarterly exit 
patterns were stronger for households that entered the Food Stamp 
Program with earnings, while the annual exit patterns were stronger 
for households that entered without earnings. The differences between 
households with and without earnings were especially pronounced for 
childless households (fourth panel). 
After October 2002, South Carolina changed its recertification 
intervals for households with fluctuating incomes from three to six 
months. The second and fifth panels, which show estimates for house-
holds that entered the Food Stamp Program during this period, indicate 
that households were more likely to leave the program at semiannual 
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Missouri households with children that began spells on or after October 2003 
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SOURCE: Authors’ calculations of Kaplan-Meier hazard probabilities from Missouri 
administrative data. 
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Figure 3.3  Estimated Food Stamp Program Exit Hazard Probabilities 
for South Carolina 
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Figure 3.3  (continued) 
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SOURCE: Authors’ calculations of Kaplan-Meier hazard probabilities from South
Carolina administrative data. 
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and annual intervals. Once again, households with earnings were more 
likely to leave at semiannual intervals, while households without earn-
ings were more likely to leave at annual intervals. 
South Carolina changed its recertification policies again in Febru-
ary 2005, setting a uniform 6-month interval for most nonelderly house-
holds. The estimates from the third and sixth panels of Figure 3.3 show 
a semiannual exit pattern with little discernible difference between 
households with and without earnings. 
Lengths of Participation Spells 
We use the hazard estimates from Figures 3.1–3.3 to calculate the 
median food stamp participation spell lengths for the different types of 
households in each entry cohort in each state. The estimated median 
spell lengths are reported in Table 3.2. The left two columns of numbers 
show median spell lengths for households with children conditional on 
those households beginning their food stamp spells with no earnings 
and with earnings. The right two columns of numbers show median 
spell lengths for nonelderly childless households with no earnings and 
with earnings. 
The estimates from Table 3.2 reveal that median food stamp spell 
lengths were generally shorter for nonelderly childless households than 
for households with children. In Georgia and Missouri, the median spell 
lengths for nonelderly childless households were all close to 7 months 
regardless of earnings status or the recertification policy, while the 
median spell lengths for households with children varied more, ranging 
from 9.0 to 12.1 months. Median spell lengths were even more variable 
in South Carolina, ranging from 6.2 to 12.9 months for nonelderly child-
less households and 9.5 to 14.5 months for households with children. 
Among households with children in Georgia and Missouri and 
among all nonelderly households in South Carolina, longer recertifica-
tion intervals appear to have increased median food stamp participation 
spells. The direct effect of the policy is shown when states switched 
from quarterly to semiannual recertifications and the median spell 
lengths for these groups increased by two to three months. When South 
Carolina subsequently reduced its recertification interval for house-
holds with fixed incomes from 12 to 6 months, median spell lengths for 
households without earnings in that state fell. 
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 Began spells before Oct. 2002
 Began spells on or after Oct. 
2003 
Missouri
 Began spells on or after Oct. 
2003 
South Carolina
 Began spells between Oct. 
2000 and Mar. 2001
 Began spells between July 
2003 and Dec. 2004
 Began spells between April 













SOURCE: Authors’ calculations of median spell lengths in months from Kaplan-Meier 
hazard probabilities from Georgia, Missouri, and South Carolina administrative data. 
More evidence for an association between recertification inter-
vals and spell lengths comes from comparisons of households with 
and without earnings. Georgia and Missouri set the same recertifica-
tion intervals for these two groups, and the median spell lengths for the 
groups were very similar. Prior to February 2005, South Carolina set 
shorter recertification intervals for households with fluctuating incomes 
than for households with fixed incomes, and median spell lengths were 
shorter for households with earnings than for households without. After 
February 2005, South Carolina adopted similar 6-month recertification 
intervals for both groups, and the differences in the groups’ median 
spell lengths narrowed. 
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MULTIVARIATE RESULTS 
Estimates of spell duration patterns, like the patterns shown in Fig-
ures 3.1–3.3, can be confounded by other unmeasured characteristics. 
For example, failing to account for general characteristics that might 
make households more or less likely to leave the Food Stamp Program, 
such as earnings ability or local economic conditions, can lead to a spu-
rious negative relationship between duration and the hazard of leaving 
the Food Stamp Program.3 So it is important to also obtain estimates of 
these patterns using multivariate statistical methods that can account for 
observed characteristics. 
For each state, we estimate discrete-time logistic hazard models 
that include separate flexible (monthly dummy variable) controls for 
the duration patterns for households that began their food stamp spells 
with and without earnings in each recertification policy period. For 
example, in Georgia we estimate models with separate flexible duration 
pattern controls for households that entered before October 2002 with 
earnings, households that entered before October 2002 without earn-
ings, households that entered on or after October 2002 with earnings, 
and households that entered on or after October 2002 without earnings. 
These models also include controls for the household’s food stamp ben-
efit level, earned income, unearned income, zero-income status, num-
ber of members, and number of children; the household head’s age, 
education, race, and marital status; the age of the youngest member; the 
presence of any elderly members (only for households with children); 
the unemployment rate in the county of residence; and general con-
trols (dummy variables) for each fiscal year. The models are estimated 
separately for households with children and for nonelderly households 
without children. 
To show the adjusted duration pattern from these models, we take 
the estimated model coefficients for a state and type of household (with 
children or nonelderly without children) and apply them to every house-
hold observation of the same type in that state to form predictions of 
the hazard rates. The predictions assume that the households entered the 
Food Stamp Program on particular dates (for example, in October 2000 
and October 2002 for Georgia) and that the households maintained the 
same observed characteristics as their first month on the program.4 Con-
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ditioning in this way approximates the distribution of population char-
acteristics over the entire sample period. Predicted hazard rates from 
this procedure for Georgia, Missouri, and South Carolina are shown in 
Figures 3.4, 3.5, and 3.6, respectively. 
The regression- and population-adjusted estimates of the food stamp 
participation spell hazard rates in Figures 3.4–3.6 are all very similar 
to the corresponding unadjusted estimates from Figures 3.1–3.3. For 
Georgia, the quarterly spikes in the exit rates in the initial policy period 
are replicated, while the semiannual spikes for all households and the 
smaller quarterly spikes for nonelderly childless households in the later 
period are also captured. For Missouri, the strong semiannual sawtooth 
patterns of exits in the later policy period are reproduced. Likewise, for 
South Carolina, all the exit patterns across household types, earnings 
status, and recertification policy periods are reproduced. Overall, the 
estimates from Figures 3.4–3.6 indicate that our findings of associations 
between the timing of food stamp exits and likely recertification dates 
are robust to controls for other observed characteristics. 
We do not have data on reasons for attrition for all our three states. 
Ribar and Edelhoch (2008) examine the reasons for exit in South Caro-
lina among households with children and find that just over half the 
exits occur because of missed recertifications and another sixth occur 
for administrative reasons such as failing to provide information. Gray 
(2018) reports that for Idaho in 2011 in more than three quarters of the 
cases where attrition occurs at a recertification deadline, exit from the 
Food Stamp Program is listed as being due to the missed deadline. In 
contrast, in other months, loss of eligibility is the primary factor, listed 
for up to 90 percent of the exits. 
CONCLUSION 
Periodic recertification in the Food Stamp Program represents a nec-
essary compromise between two competing policy objectives. On the 
one hand, states need accurate information to determine whether house-
holds remain eligible for the program and what participating house-
holds’ benefits should be. On the other hand, supplying and processing 
information imposes real costs on households and the state agencies. 
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Figure 3.4  Regression- and Population-Adjusted Food Stamp Program 
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Georgia households without children simulated to begin spells in October 2000 
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Georgia households without children simulated to begin spells in October 2002 
No earnings Earnings 
1 4 7 10 13 16 19 22 25 28 
Months 
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations of hazard probabilities obtained by applying coeffi-
cients from multivariate, discrete-time hazard models of food stamp exits estimated 
using Georgia administrative data to first-month observations from all observed spells 
in those data and assuming the specified start months. 
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Figure 3.5  Regression- and Population-Adjusted Food Stamp Program 










Missouri households with children simulated to begin spells in October 2003 
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Missouri households without children simulated to begin spells in October 2003 
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SOURCE: Authors’ calculations of hazard probabilities obtained by applying coeffi-
cients from multivariate, discrete-time hazard models of food stamp exits estimated 
using Missouri administrative data to first-month observations from all observed 
spells in those data and assuming the specified start months. 
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States want to minimize these costs so that they do not discourage pro-
gram participation or waste administrative resources.5 
This chapter has examined data on the duration of food stamp par-
ticipation spells from the administrative systems for Georgia, Missouri, 
and South Carolina using descriptive and multivariate event-history 
methods and compared the timing of households’ exits from these spells 
to the timing of likely recertification dates. The analyses provide strong 
evidence that households are substantially more likely to leave the Food 
Stamp Program in months when they face recertifications than in other 
months. There is also evidence that longer intervals between recertifica-
tions are associated with longer spells of food stamp participation. The 
positive association between the lengths of recertification intervals and 
spell lengths, in turn, almost certainly contributes to higher caseload 
levels because there is no reason to believe longer recertification inter-
vals reduce new program entry. The longer intervals reduce flows out of 
the program but do not reduce the flows into the program. 
The evidence regarding the association of exit timing and recer-
tification intervals is strong in several respects. First, in every analy-
sis that we conduct, the probabilities of households exiting the Food 
Stamp Program are two to three times higher in likely recertification 
months than in the preceding or following months. Among the three 
states that we examine, we were able to compare six different policy 
regimes (two for Georgia, one for Missouri, and three for South Caro-
lina). The substantial increases in exit probabilities in likely recertifica-
tion months appear in every one of these regimes. Also, all three states 
increased their recertification intervals from three months to six months 
for at least some identifiable groups over this period. When the intervals 
increased for the two states that we could examine, the spikes in exit 
behavior at three months completely disappeared. To borrow a meta-
phor from Sherlock Holmes, the quarterly spikes that do not appear 
during these semiannual policy periods are the dogs that do not bark. 
Second, our findings are robust across states and across household 
types within those states. In all our analyses, we report results separately 
for households with children and nonelderly households without chil-
dren. Within these groups we also report results separately for house-
holds that began their food stamp spells with and without earnings. The 
patterns of exit timing for these groups match when the groups face the 
same recertification policy and differ when they face different policies. 
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Figure 3.6  Regression- and Population-Adjusted Food Stamp Program 
Exit Hazard Probabilities for South Carolina 
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Figure 3.6  (continued) 
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SOURCE: Authors’ calculations of hazard probabilities obtained by applying coefficients from
multivariate, discrete-time hazard models of food stamp exits estimated using South Carolina 
administrative data to first-month observations from all observed spells in those data and assum-
ing the specified start months. 
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Third, our results are robust to the inclusion of multivariate controls 
for other observed characteristics of the households, relevant program 
variables, local economic conditions, and time trends. 
One of the states that we study, South Carolina, initially set shorter 
recertification intervals for working households than for other house-
holds, and all our states set either shorter recertification intervals or 
stricter recertification procedures for households with working-age, 
work-able members than for households with elderly or disabled mem-
bers. The results from our analyses indicate that these policies reduce 
food stamp spell lengths among working or work-able households rela-
tive to other households. Thus, these administrative procedures could 
account for some of the differences in food stamp participation between 
working families and other households. The more onerous administra-
tive procedures for working families could also have the unintended 
consequence of discouraging work. 
Our analyses lead to many strong positive findings in the sense we 
can conclude that the lengths of recertification intervals influence the 
timing of food stamp exits and the duration of food stamp spells. How-
ever, it is much harder to draw normative findings from this evidence in 
the sense of saying whether these relationships are good or bad. Shorter 
recertification periods could be reducing the amount of time that ineli-
gible households remain on the program and continue to receive ben-
efits. However, the shorter periods could also be creating administrative 
obstacles to program participation that discourage needy households, 
and especially poor working households, from continuing their partici-
pation spells. 
Notes 
1. Formally, the discrete hazard is a conditional probability. We will refer to it simply 
as a hazard or probability in what follows. For small values it is the same as the 
continuous time hazard evaluated over the relevant period. 
2. Let T be a random variable that denotes the possible spell length, and let t be a 
particular spell duration. The survival probability is S(t) = Prob(T ≥ t), and the 
hazard probability is λ(t) = Prob(T = t | T ≥ t). Then S(t) = (1- λ(1)) · (1 − λ(2)) · … ·
(1 − λ(t−1)). 
3. If some individuals are more likely to leave food stamps at all times, such indi-
viduals will tend to exit earlier in a spell, causing the observed empirical hazard of 
leaving food stamps to decline. It will therefore appear that the hazard of leaving 
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declines over time, even if the hazard remains unchanged for any one individual 
(Heckman 1981). 
4.	 We have program, household, and economic characteristics observed in the first 
month for every household in our administrative samples. We cannot control 
for changes in these characteristics that individuals experience in later months 
because some households leave the Food Stamp Program, and we are not able to 
observe them after that. 
5. See Prell (2008) and Pei (2017), who develop formal models for the decision of 
how often to require recertification in social programs. Prell concludes that the 
optimal period for the WIC program is between 7 and 14 months, and Pei con-
cludes that the optimum for Medicaid/CHIP is at least 12 months. Both are longer 
than common recertificaton periods for these programs. 
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Time Limits on Able-Bodied 
Adults without Dependents 
Means-testing of eligibility and benefits in public assistance pro-
grams, including the Food Stamp Program, creates potential disincen-
tives to work. If people value both consumption and the time that they 
spend outside the labor market, a transfer of assistance from the govern-
ment allows them to increase both consumption and nonmarket time, 
with the increase in nonmarket time translating to a decrease in market 
work. Economists refer to this work disincentive as the income effect. 
Means-testing also reduces benefits by some proportion as people’s 
incomes, including their income from earnings, increase. This reduces 
the marginal value of work and effectively serves as a wage decrease, 
creating a substitution effect that further reduces the incentives to work. 
Because of these reinforcing income and substitution effects, people are 
expected to work less (or possibly not work at all) when means-tested 
assistance is offered.1 
The work disincentives of public assistance programs create a 
conundrum for policymakers. On the one hand, food stamps and other 
types of public assistance alleviate some of the worst hardships associ-
ated with poverty. In the case of food stamps, the benefits may mean 
the difference between someone eating and going hungry. On the other 
hand, insofar as public assistance discourages work, it undermines eco-
nomic self-sufficiency and increases people’s dependence on the pro-
grams. Absent other changes in opportunities or people’s behavior, the 
programs can create a “poverty trap” in which people are stuck on assis-
tance for a long time. 
One way to overcome these work disincentives and break out of 
this trap is for public assistance programs to require people with the 
capacity for employment to work or participate in other activities, such 
as schooling or job training, that are consistent with eventual economic 
self-sufficiency. Work requirements have long been a feature of cash 
assistance programs in the United States. Less well known is that the 
71 
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Food Stamp Program has also had a history of work requirements and 
work readiness requirements, for at least some recipients. 
Botsko et al. (2001) review some of this history. Since the early 
1970s, the Food Stamp Program has required working-age adults who 
are not in school or caring for others to accept suitable employment if 
it is offered to them. Over time, the proportion of food stamp recipients 
who were subject to work requirements increased, and the requirements 
themselves became more stringent. Legislation in 1985 required states 
to create Employment and Training (E&T) programs and to meet cer-
tain performance thresholds. Recipients who failed to comply with the 
E&T requirements and could not show “good cause” faced sanctions 
that ranged from a temporary suspension of benefits to a permanent 
disqualification from the program. 
The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation 
Act (PRWORA) of 1996 created a much tougher set of work require-
ments. The PRWORA mandated that able-bodied adults without depen-
dents (ABAWDs), who were defined as people aged 18–49 who were 
not disabled or caring for a child or disabled family member, had to 
either work or participate in some other qualifying activity for at least 
20 hours per week. ABAWDs who failed to meet this requirement faced 
a time limit on the receipt of food stamp benefits of three months in a 
given three-year period. The work and qualifying activity requirements 
were much more onerous than those under the E&T programs, and the 
short time limit was much stricter than the earlier sanction policy. The 
E&T requirements remained in place for other food stamp recipients, 
such as parents of older children. 
The PRWORA allowed states, at their discretion but subject to 
approval from the USDA, to waive the work requirements for ABAWDs 
living in areas that were suffering from high unemployment, which was 
subsequently defined as an unemployment rate in excess of 10 percent 
or designation as a labor surplus area by the U.S. Department Labor.2 
A year later, the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 further allowed states to 
apply for exemptions from the work requirements and time limits for 
up to 15 percent of their ABAWD caseloads. The intention behind these 
waiver and exemption provisions was that it would be unfair to require 
work in areas where jobs would be difficult to find. 
Waivers and exemptions to the ABAWD work requirements were 
requested by the states and approved by the USDA on a year-by-year 
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basis. This meant that different areas within the requesting states were 
covered at different times, leading not only to geographic variation in 
the rules but also to time-series variation for particular areas. Over the 
period 2001–2007, Georgia, Missouri, and South Carolina each sought 
and obtained this type of relief. Table 4.1 shows the number of counties 
affected by waivers and exemptions in the states as of January 1 of each 
study year. 
In Georgia, 45–61 of 159 counties were fully or partially affected in 
any given year. Georgia applied for and obtained high unemployment 
and labor surplus waivers for many entire counties, as well as for some 
cities. 
The variation in waivers and exemptions for Missouri was even 
larger. Missouri’s ABAWD waivers were initially applied very selec-
tively—prior to August 2000, of 115 county units, only 26 counties 
and the city of St. Louis had waivers, and in 2001 the number of areas 
with waivers fell to 21.3 However, beginning in August 2001, Mis-
souri started using a less restrictive definition of labor surplus, which 
resulted in waivers for 10 more counties, and in November 2001, the 
state obtained a 15 percent exemption for 38 additional counties based 
Table 4.1 Counties with Waivers or Exemptions from ABAWD 
Time Limits 
Georgia Missouri South Carolina 
(159 counties) (115 areasa) (46 counties) 
Year All Portions All Portions All Portions 
2001 55 (6) 27 – 24 – 
2002 50 (5) 69 – 25 – 
2003 51 (4) 70 – 46 – 
2004 48 (11) 82 – 46 – 
2005 41 (12) 103 – 46 – 
2006 42 (10) 105 – 46 – 
2007 43 (2) 38 – 46 – 
aMissouri has 114 counties and one independent city (St. Louis). 
NOTE: The table lists counts of affected counties as of January in the year shown in the 
left column. The “all” column lists the number of counties in which the entire county 
was exempted or waived; the “portion” column lists the number of counties in which 
a city was exempted or waived but other portions of the county were not. 
SOURCE: State agencies overseeing Food Stamp Program. 
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solely on their small populations, rather than their economic circum-
stances. As part of the same 15 percent exemption, Missouri effectively 
extended the time limit for ABAWDs living in larger counties to six 
months. The number of areas in Missouri with waivers or exemptions 
grew over the next few years until it reached 105 by January 2006. In 
2007, however, the number fell substantially to just 38 areas. 
South Carolina followed a different approach. In 2001 and early 
2002, the state obtained exemptions or waivers for just over half of its 
counties. Beginning in October 2002, however, it obtained a special 
waiver from the USDA to treat the entire state—all 46 counties—as a 
single labor surplus area. Thus, from October 2002 until the end of our 
study period, all ABAWDs in South Carolina were effectively exempted 
from the time limits and work rules. 
In this chapter, we use administrative data on Food Stamp Program 
spells from Georgia, Missouri, and South Carolina to compare the food 
stamp exit behavior of households that lived in areas with ABAWD 
time limits to households that lived in areas with exemptions and waiv-
ers to the time limits. We focus on households without children and 
without elderly members, as these were the households that were most 
likely to contain ABAWDs. However, for purposes of comparison, we 
also examine the exit behavior of households with children (some of 
these also contained ABAWD members) and households with only 
elderly members (these would not have contained ABAWD members). 
Our expectation entering this analysis is that food stamp recipients who 
were subject to the work requirements and time limits would have been 
more likely to leave the Food Stamp Program than recipients who were 
not subject to the requirements, especially during the first few months 
of their participation spells. 
PREVIOUS RESEARCH 
Although food stamp participation and caseload outcomes for 
ABAWDs have been examined in many studies, including Bartlett et 
al. (2004); Currie and Grogger (2001); Farrell et al. (2003); Gleason,
Schochet, and Moffitt (1998); and Kornfeld (2002), the specific effects 
of time limits and work rules for ABAWDs have been considered by 
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only a handful of studies. In an early study, Stravrianos and Nixon (1998) 
use data on ABAWDs’ employment and food stamp participation pat-
terns that were collected prior to the passage of the PRWORA to predict 
how many ABAWDs might be affected by the time limits. They forecast 
that very few ABAWDs would be able to meet the work requirements 
and that a large proportion would lose eligibility. A descriptive analysis 
by Czajka et al. (2001) reports on the numbers of ABAWDs who were 
dropped from the Food Stamp Program and appears to confirm these 
fears. Neither of these studies provides causal evidence of an impact of 
the requirements. 
Several studies examine how the overall food stamp caseloads 
in states responded to the ABAWD policies, using the percentage of 
ABAWDs in each state who were exempt from the time limits as a 
measure of these policies. The results from these studies are equivo-
cal. Wilde et al. (2000) and Ziliak, Gundersen, and Figlio (2003) find 
that these exemption measures were associated with higher caseloads, 
while Danielson and Klerman (2006) find that the measures were not 
significantly associated with caseloads. All three studies suffer from 
weak research designs. First, the studies examine aggregate food stamp 
caseloads rather than the ABAWD caseload specifically. Because of the 
modest number of ABAWDs in the overall caseload, we would expect 
that this would substantially dilute any estimated effect of time limit 
policies. Second, the statewide measure of the percentage of ABAWDs 
exempt from time limits only captures the probability of a person being 
exempt. This is a much cruder policy measure than someone’s actual 
exemption status. 
Ribar, Edelhoch, and Liu (2010) report stronger evidence of 
ABAWD policy effects. They examine the timing of exits from Food 
Stamp Program spells among adult-only households, using adminis-
trative data from South Carolina. They find that program spells were 
shorter for households with likely ABAWD members living in counties 
with time limits and work rules than for similar households living in 
counties with exemptions or waivers to those rules. The researchers 
also distinguish between exits that were and were not associated with 
employment and find that the time limits and work rules increased both 
types of exits. Thus, while the work requirements were associated with 
greater economic self-sufficiency for some ABAWDs, they appeared to 
increase hardships for others. In this chapter, we extend the analysis of 
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program exits by Ribar et al., which was limited to South Carolina, to 
also investigate data from Georgia and Missouri. 
DESCRIPTIVE EVIDENCE 
To examine the relationship between ABAWD work requirements 
and people’s food stamp participation behavior, we use administrative 
data on participation spells and follow the empirical approach from 
the previous chapter to estimate monthly Kaplan-Meier hazard prob-
abilities for groups that were likely to face different work requirements. 
Specifically, we estimate hazard probabilities for three different, mutu-
ally exclusive types of households: childless nonelderly households, 
households with children, and households with only elderly members. 
The first group—childless nonelderly households—consists of 
people aged 18–49, which conforms with the ABAWD age range. The 
age range for this group differs from the nonelderly age range used 
in the previous chapter (18–59).4 With these age restrictions and with 
the absence of children, this group includes households with ABAWDs, 
but it also includes households with nonelderly disabled members, 
who would not be ABAWDs. While we would have liked to identify 
ABAWD households more precisely, the administrative data for the dif-
ferent states lacked reliable indicators for disability status. In the end, 
we chose a category of households that had a high probability of con-
taining ABAWD members but that could also be constructed compara-
bly across states. 
The other two groups of households are used as pseudo-controls 
in our analyses. Households with children usually do not contain 
ABAWDs, although some of these households, such as those with both 
adult and minor children and with multiple generations co-residing, 
might include ABAWDs. Parents and other adults in households with 
children might also be affected by exemptions and waivers if they are 
mandatory participants in their state’s E&T program. Households with 
only “elderly” members (defined in this chapter as people who are at 
least 50 years old) do not contain ABAWDs; however, these households 
may be less comparable because of their sources of income and work 
limitations. 
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For all three types of households, we estimate separate hazard prob-
abilities for households that lived in counties that had exemptions or 
waivers from the ABAWD work requirements and counties that did not 
have exemptions or waivers—that is, counties in which the rules were 
in force. 
These comparisons are inexact. As mentioned, the comparisons do 
not precisely identify ABAWD and non-ABAWD households. Also, the 
characteristics that we use to distinguish households in these descriptive 
analyses are all measured as of the start of the households’ food stamp 
spells. A household’s composition could change over the course of a 
spell. Also, the household’s county of residence or its county’s exemp-
tion or waiver status could change during the spell. These issues with 
time-varying household and county characteristics are addressed in our 
multivariate analyses and do not appear to affect the results much. 
Figure 4.1 displays graphs of the monthly food stamp exit hazard 
probabilities for the first 24 months of households’ program spells in 
Georgia. The top panel shows the hazards for nonelderly childless 
households who began their food stamp spells in either an exempt or 
nonexempt county.5 The middle panel shows the hazards for households 
with children, and the bottom panel shows the hazards for households 
with only elderly members. 
Nonelderly childless households living in Georgia counties with 
ABAWD work rules and time limits were much more likely to leave 
the Food Stamp Program during the first 6 months of their spells than 
similar households living in counties that were exempt from these rules. 
The differences in the probabilities over these months are substantial, 
ranging from 2.1 to 5.6 percentage points, and 21 to 67 percent in rela-
tive terms. After the sixth month, the differences in the hazard prob-
abilities for the households in exempt and nonexempt counties are gen-
erally smaller, and are sometimes negative and sometimes positive after 
month 13. The differences seem consistent with the effects of the time 
limits—higher hazard rates appeared in counties that were subject to 
these policies, appeared in the first few months of spells when time 
limits would have had their effects, and were less apparent during later 
periods in the spells when time limits would have been less relevant. 
The differences in the hazard rates for nonelderly adults lead to 
noticeable differences in their median spell lengths. The median food 
stamp spell for nonelderly adult-only households living in nonexempt 
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Figure 4.1  Estimated Food Stamp Program Exit Hazard Probabilities 
for Georgia Households Living in Counties with and without 
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SOURCE: Authors’ calculations of Kaplan-Meier hazard probabilities from Georgia 
administrative data for FY 2001–2007. 
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counties in Georgia was 6.6 months, while the median spell for non-
elderly adult-only households living in exempt counties was 9.2 months. 
We see smaller differences in exit behavior for other Georgia house-
holds living in exempt and nonexempt counties, and the pattern of dif-
ferences over the food stamp spell is not the same. From the middle 
panel of Figure 4.1, households with children living in nonexempt 
counties were no more likely to leave Georgia’s Food Stamp Program 
during the first four months of their spells than households living in 
exempt counties. However, for some months after the fourth, house-
holds living in nonexempt counties had elevated risks of leaving. The 
small differences in exit behavior contribute to modest differences in 
median spell lengths—11.0 and 12.1 months for those living in non-
exempt and exempt counties, respectively. These differences may be 
attributable to the nonexempt counties having better economic circum-
stances than exempt counties. For elderly households, we see a similar 
pattern with no differences in the second and third months of a spell but 
some differences at later durations. The contrast in findings between 
nonelderly childless households and these two other groups of house-
holds, especially during the early months of spell durations, strengthens 
the interpretation of the results for the former group as indicating effects 
of ABAWD work rules and time limits. 
We repeat this analysis for Missouri, using the data from FY 2004– 
2007. Figure 4.2 shows monthly hazard probabilities estimated for 
nonelderly households without children (top panel), households with 
children (middle panel), and households with only elderly members 
(bottom panel). For each of these groups, we estimate hazard probabili-
ties separately for households living in counties with exemptions to the 
ABAWD work rules (dashed lines) and counties without exemptions 
(solid lines). 
From these data, we see patterns that are qualitatively similar to 
those from Georgia, although differences are somewhat smaller. Non-
elderly childless households living in nonexempt areas and thus poten-
tially subject to the ABAWD work rules and time limits had hazard 
probabilities during the first 7 months of their spells that were higher 
than those for households living in exempt counties. After those first 7 
months, the hazard patterns for the remainder of the spells are indis-
tinguishable. The median spell length for nonelderly adult-only house-
holds in nonexempt counties was 6.7 months, while the median spell 
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Figure 4.2  Estimated Food Stamp Program Exit Hazard Probabilities 
for Missouri Households Living in Counties with and without 
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SOURCE: Authors’ calculations of Kaplan-Meier hazard probabilities from Missouri 
administrative data for FY 2004–2007. 
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
 
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Time Limits on Able-Bodied Adults without Dependents  81 
length for nonelderly adult-only households in exempt counties was 
7.2 months. There were few noticeable differences in the hazard prob-
abilities over most parts of the spells for households with children and 
households with only elderly members. These groups also exhibited 
few differences in median spell lengths between nonexempt and exempt 
counties. Despite the fact that differences between hazard probabilities 
for those in exempt and nonexempt counties are small, the results pro-
vide a clear confirmation of our hypothesis. ABAWD time limit poli-
cies induce differences in the exit probabilities early in a spell, but such 
effects are not present in households without ABAWDs. 
Figure 4.3 shows the descriptive hazard estimates for South Caro-
lina. Recall that South Carolina obtained a statewide exemption for all 
its counties after FY 2002. Because of this, we limit our descriptive 
analysis to spells and benefit months from FY 2001–2002 to increase 
the comparability between the exempt and nonexempt counties. From 
the top panel, we see that nonelderly childless households for this 
period had substantially higher hazard probabilities during the first five 
months of their food stamp spells if they lived in counties that were 
subject to the ABAWD work rules and time limits than if they lived 
in other counties. The differences in the hazard rates were especially 
pronounced in the third and fourth months of the spells, near the point 
where the time limit would have come into play. Starting in the sixth 
month, there were fewer discernable differences, with higher exit rates 
in some months for households living in nonexempt counties but higher 
in other months for households living in exempt counties. The differ-
ences in the estimated hazard rates lead to substantial differences in the 
median spell lengths. The median spell for nonelderly adult-only house-
holds living in nonexempt counties was 7.6 months, while the median 
spell for nonelderly adult-only households living in exempt counties 
was 11.2 months. The results in the top panel, which use administrative 
data from FY 2001–2002, are consistent with the results from Ribar, 
Edelhoch, and Liu (2010), which use data from FY 1996–2005. More 
generally, the results fit with what we would expect from the ABAWD 
time limit policy. 
The next two panels in Figure 4.3 show food stamp exit hazard 
estimates for South Carolina households with children (middle panel) 
and households with only elderly members (bottom panel). For both 
groups, households living in nonexempt counties had exit hazard prob-
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Figure 4.3  Estimated Food Stamp Program Exit Hazard Probabilities 
for South Carolina Households Living in Counties with and 
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SOURCE: Authors’ calculations of Kaplan-Meier hazard probabilities from South Car-
olina administrative data for FY 2001–2002. 
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abilities that were slightly higher and median spell lengths that were 
slightly shorter than the hazards for households living in exempt coun-
ties in most months. These led to modest differences in median spell 
lengths, which may indicate that better economic circumstances in non-
exempt counties played a role in food stamp exits. In the next section,
we reexamine the hazard relationships using multivariate models that 
explicitly control for county economic conditions and other observable 
characteristics of households. 
MULTIVARIATE RESULTS 
For each state and for each of the three types of households, we esti-
mate discrete-time logistic hazard models (Alison 1982) of food stamp 
exits that include separate flexible (monthly dummy variable) controls 
for the duration patterns for households that were living in counties with 
exemptions or waivers or in counties without exemptions or waivers. 
Our multivariate models also include controls for the household’s food 
stamp benefit level, earned income, unearned income, zero-income sta-
tus, number of members, and number of children (for households with 
children); the household head’s age, education, race, and marital status; 
the age of the youngest member (households with children); and the 
presence of any members over age 60 (where appropriate). In addi-
tion to measures that capture detailed recipient characteristics, we also 
control for fiscal year fixed effects and the level of unemployment in 
the county. Because exempt counties generally have slower-growing 
economies than nonexempt counties, observed differences might reflect 
different labor markets, so controls for unemployment are expected to 
remove or at least reduce observed differences. 
To show the adjusted duration patterns from these models, we take 
the estimated model coefficients for a state and type of household and 
apply them to every household observation of the same type in that 
state to form predictions of the hazard rates. The predictions assume 
that the households entered the Food Stamp Program on particular 
dates—October 2000 for Georgia and South Carolina and October 2003 
for Missouri—and that the households maintained the same observed 
characteristics as their first month on the program. Predicted hazard 
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rates from this procedure for Georgia, Missouri, and South Carolina are 
shown in Figures 4.4, 4.5, and 4.6, respectively. 
The predicted hazard probabilities from the multivariate models 
show the same general patterns as the descriptive estimates. Even after 
adjusting for economic conditions and household characteristics, non-
elderly childless households were more likely to leave the Food Stamp 
Program during the early months of their participation spells if they 
lived in counties that were subject to the ABAWD work rules and time 
limits than if they lived in counties with exemptions or waivers to these 
rules. These differences appear for all three states that we examine. Also 
consistent with the descriptive results, there were fewer differences and 
less consistent patterns in the later months of the spells. 
In contrast, the patterns of predicted hazard results for households 
with children and for elderly households vary across states. In Geor-
gia, the predicted hazards for these groups were higher in some months 
if they were living in nonexempt counties than if they were living in 
exempt counties but only during the later months of predicted food 
stamp spells. For households with children and elderly households in 
Missouri, there were few differences between the predicted hazards for 
those living in nonexempt and exempt counties. In South Carolina, pre-
dicted hazards for the comparison groups in the early months of their 
food stamp spells were slightly higher in nonexempt counties than in 
exempt counties. However, there were fewer consistent differences in 
the later months of their spells. 
CONCLUSION 
Since the early 1970s, the Food Stamp Program has used work 
requirements of various forms to overcome the program’s employment 
disincentives. With the enactment of the PRWORA in 1996, the pro-
gram adopted an especially stringent requirement that ABAWDs could 
receive benefits only for three months in a given three-year period 
unless they worked or participated in equivalent activities for at least 20 
hours a week. The work rules and time limits were expected to reduce 
program participation. 
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Figure 4.4  Regression- and Population-Adjusted Food Stamp Program 
Exit Hazard Probabilities for Georgia Households Living in 
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SOURCE: Authors’ calculations of hazard probabilities obtained by applying coeffi-
cients from multivariate, discrete-time hazard models of food stamp exits estimated 
using Georgia administrative data to first-month observations from all observed spells 
in those data and assuming the specified start months. 
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Figure 4.5  Regression- and Population-Adjusted Food Stamp Program 
Exit Hazard Probabilities for Missouri Households Living in 
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SOURCE: Authors’ calculations of hazard probabilities obtained by applying coeffi-
cients from multivariate, discrete-time hazard models of food stamp exits estimated 
using Missouri administrative data to first-month observations from all observed 
spells in those data and assuming the specified start months. 
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Figure 4.6  Regression- and Population-Adjusted Food Stamp Program 
Exit Hazard Probabilities for South Carolina Households 
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SOURCE: Authors’ calculations of hazard probabilities obtained by applying coeffi-
cients from multivariate, discrete-time hazard models of food stamp exits estimated 
using South Carolina administrative data to first-month observations from all observed 
spells in those data and assuming the specified start months. 
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The PRWORA allowed states to apply for waivers from these 
requirements in areas with poor job prospects, and subsequent legisla-
tion allowed states to apply for exemptions for up to 15 percent of their 
ABAWD caseloads. The three states that we study obtained exemptions 
and waivers for specific periods for specific geographic areas. This cre-
ated a situation in which some identifiable households were potentially 
subject to the ABAWD work rules and time limits while another set of 
identifiable households was not. We use this geographic and longitudi-
nal variation in the applicability of the ABAWD rules to examine their 
effects on households’ food stamp exit behavior. 
In descriptive and multivariate event-history analyses, we uniformly 
find that childless households with adults aged 18–49 living in counties 
that were subject to the ABAWD work rules and time limits were more 
likely to leave the Food Stamp Program during the early months of their 
program spells than similar households living in counties with exemp-
tions or waivers to these rules. The differences in the hazard probabili-
ties were substantial. Nonelderly childless households were estimated 
to be several percentage points more likely to leave the program in each 
of their second through sixth spell months if they lived in a nonexempt 
county. These differences in program exit behavior among nonelderly 
childless households were largely confined to the first few months of a 
spell. Nevertheless, they led to nonelderly childless households having 
much shorter median spell lengths if they were living in a nonexempt 
county and potentially subject to the ABAWD rules. It is notable that 
controls for individual characteristics or the local economy had no sys-
temic effect on estimates. 
We also find some evidence of differences in exit behavior by county 
exemption status among two pseudo-control groups: households with 
children and households with only elderly members. However, the dif-
ferences—when they appeared—tended to be muted compared to those 
for nonelderly childless households. Also, the differences were much 
less uniform for households in exempt counties, which sometimes had 
higher exit probabilities than households in nonexempt counties. 
The patterns of findings, with relatively large differences in exit 
behavior appearing for nonelderly childless households and mainly in 
the early months of program spells, fit with what we would expect from 
an ABAWD time limit policy. The empirical findings strongly sug-
gest that work rules and time limits for ABAWDs shortened their Food 
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Stamp Program spells and reduced their participation. These results 
appeared in all three states and in multivariate analyses. Thus, the find-
ings are robust in a number of ways. 
There are some important qualifications to this analysis. First, while 
we can identify households that are more likely than others to include 
ABAWDs, we cannot pinpoint these households exactly. In particular, 
our group of nonelderly childless households meets two of the three 
principal criteria for the ABAWD classification—the age and house-
hold structure criteria. However, we do not know the disability sta-
tus of household members, which means that some might not contain 
ABAWDs. We expect, though, that a more precise identification would 
lead to even larger differences. Second, we do not have direct informa-
tion about whether or when a household has reached its time limit. A
household on its second spell within a three-year period might already 
have some months that were counted toward its limit. Also, some 
states, including Missouri, allowed for slightly longer time limits than 
the three months specified in the PRWORA. Third, our pseudo-control 
groups of households with children and with elderly members might 
not be directly comparable to nonelderly childless households, and the 
households with children might include ABAWD members or members 
subject to other E&T requirements. Finally, we use a county’s exemp-
tion or waiver status as an indicator for the applicability of ABAWD 
work rules and time limits, and these counties might not be comparable, 
as waivers were granted on the basis of economic conditions. 
These qualifications notwithstanding, the evidence strongly points 
to work rules and time limits hastening exits from the Food Stamp 
Program, shortening program spells, and reducing program participa-
tion. The implications for households’ well-being are more ambiguous. 
ABAWDs who left the Food Stamp Program because they transitioned 
to work and lost eligibility for financial reasons might have been made 
better off. However, ABAWDs who failed to find jobs and were time-
limited off the Food Stamp Program were almost certainly worse off, at 
least in the short run. The time limits may have contributed to increased 
work and earnings for some ABAWDs but, for those who remained 
unemployed for extended periods, immiseration would surely have 
increased. 
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Notes 
1. Hoynes and Schanzenbach (2012) provide empirical evidence that the introduc-
tion of food stamps in the 1960s and 1970s did, in fact, cause female household 
heads to decrease work effort. Using data for the 1980s, Hagstrom (1996) exam-
ines married couples’ response to food stamps, finding small effects, mostly for 
females. A recent discussion of work disincentive effects of SNAP is provided by 
Moffitt (2016), who explicitly considers the way that participation in multiple pro-
grams influences work incentives. Although he suggests that work disincentives 
are minimal for the poorest SNAP participants, disincentives are often substantial 
for those whose earnings are just below self-sufficiency. In contrast, focusing on 
the combined impacts of U.S. safety net programs during the economic downturn 
after 2007, Mulligan (2012) argues that the increased generosity of these pro-
grams induced a substantial decline in work incentives for a wide range of work-
ers, results at odds with those of Moffitt. An extended exchange can be found in 
Moffitt (2015) and Mulligan (2015). 
2. An area can be designated as a labor surplus area if the average unemployment 
rate over the prior 24 months was 20 percent above the average in the United 
States, or under “exceptional circumstances.” Although criteria vary over time, 
this latter designation is generally used when a recent increase in unemployment, 
possibly not reflected in current statistics, is expected to last into the subsequent 
year. See https://www.doleta.gov/programs/lsa_faq.cfm (accessed Oct. 23, 2018). 
3. Prior to FY 2001, Missouri’s unemployment rate was substantially below the 
national rate. In FY 2002 and 2003 Missouri’s unemployment rate was near or 
below the national rate. The state’s unemployment rate peaked in 2004, well after 
the peak in the national rate. Low unemployment rates relative to the national rate 
made it harder for Missouri to obtain “labor surplus” designations for its counties. 
4.	 Besides differing from other chapters, our definition of “elderly” in this chapter 
differs from the Food Stamp Program definition used for other purposes, which is 
based on the age-60 cutoff. 
5. Here and throughout the rest of the chapter, we use the single word exempt to 
mean either exempt or waived from the ABAWD work rules and time limits. 
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Improving the Program 
for Working Families 
SQUEEZING A POLICY BALLOON 
The principal objective of the Food Stamp Program is to help 
low-income families obtain better and more nutritious diets than they 
otherwise could afford. Within this objective are several other goals, 
including operating the program as efficiently as possible by targeting 
benefits to the truly needy and promoting economic self-sufficiency 
among families. Different aspects of the Food Stamp Program work to 
further these goals. The benefits associated with the program expand 
families’ resource sets, which allows them to purchase more and better 
food. Means-testing, recertification, reporting requirements, and veri-
fication are intended to target assistance, which promotes efficiency. 
Work requirements for able-bodied adults and lower benefit reduction 
rates for earnings are intended to encourage work and thereby foster 
economic self-sufficiency. 
While each of these policies advances one or more of the program’s 
goals, they also have the unfortunate effect of undermining others. 
Higher benefits may improve access to nutrition, but they also generate 
income effects that may discourage work and economic self-sufficiency. 
Means-testing limits eligibility to low-income families and concentrates 
assistance among the neediest families, but it also disincentivizes work 
and accurate income reporting. More frequent recertifications, more 
intrusive income reporting, and tougher verification requirements can 
improve the information about clients’ circumstances, but they under-
mine the program’s principal objective by reducing participation. Time 
limits and other work requirements encourage some food stamp partici-
pants to find jobs, but they can sever benefits for others who are either 
unable or unwilling to work. 
At times it seems that these different policy considerations are like 
squeezing a balloon. You tighten your grip around one part of the bal-
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loon and another part of the balloon expands. Grab ahold of that part of 
the balloon, and yet another part expands. Policies enacted in the early 
and mid-1990s, most notably the Personal Responsibility and Work 
Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) in 1996, tended to impose 
more stringent requirements on participants. However, policymakers 
quickly grew concerned that vulnerable groups might suffer. From 1996 
until 2013, most of the changes in the Food Stamp Program took the 
form of relaxing requirements, especially for working households. 
In this chapter, we review a wide set of policy changes that have 
likely boosted participation among working families and also encour-
aged work among food stamp families. We begin by reviewing the evi-
dence and drawing policy implications from our previous three chap-
ters regarding how work and earnings are reported in the Food Stamp 
Program, how certification intervals are associated with participation 
behavior, and how ABAWD time limits are also associated with par-
ticipation. Beyond longer certification intervals and reduced applicabil-
ity of the ABAWD time limits, we review other ways that food stamp 
policies were relaxed (or at least changed) between 2001 and 2007. 
Finally, we examine the program since the onset of the 2007 recession 
and subsequent recovery, considering both changes in the program and 
the debates surrounding it. We hazard a prediction on the fate of the 
program over the next decade. Finally, we discuss some ways in which 
we might further modify the program to benefit working families. 
OUR FINDINGS 
Chapter 2 introduced the administrative data that we used in our 
empirical analyses of Georgia, Missouri, and South Carolina. These 
data provide precise information about households’ Food Stamp Pro-
gram outcomes and reveal the information that was available to pro-
gram administrators. At the same time, the data have limitations, of 
which the biggest may be that they record only the earnings that were 
reported to state food stamp agencies and not necessarily the earnings 
that clients actually received. Comparisons of earnings reported by the 
clients in the food stamp records and of earnings separately reported by 
their employers to the states’ Unemployment Insurance (UI) systems 
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indicate substantial disagreement. In particular, the average incidence 
and amounts of earnings reported on behalf of food stamp households 
in the UI systems were each higher than the averages reported to the 
food stamp agencies. Food stamp agency data indicate that about a third 
of households in the states that we studied worked, but our augmented 
data indicate that the true figure may be one half or more. Depending 
on the state and year, the average monthly value of earnings reported by 
households to food stamp agencies was $30–$114 less than the average 
amounts recorded in the UI systems. Some of the apparent underreport-
ing of earnings may be illicit. However, some is sanctioned by state 
policies where benefits are based on clients’ expected future income 
and other policies that do not require clients to report certain types of 
income changes within certification periods. We discuss income report-
ing policies more in the next section of this chapter. 
In Chapter 3, we used the administrative data from each state to 
examine how the timing of exits from food stamp participation spells 
and the durations of those spells varied with the timing of clients’ peri-
odic recertifications for eligibility and benefits. The analyses for all 
three states revealed that food stamp households were several times 
more likely to end their participation spells in months when recertifica-
tions were due than in months they were not. During our analysis period, 
each of our states increased its recertification intervals for households 
with earnings from 3 months to 6 months, and our data allowed us to 
investigate participation spells under both the 3- and 6-month regimes 
in two of the states. We estimated that longer recertification intervals 
led to longer median spell lengths, which would have increased par-
ticipation. Late in our analysis period, one of our analysis states, South 
Carolina, shortened its recertification interval for households with fixed 
sources of unearned income from 12 to 6 months. We found that the 
median spell lengths for the affected households decreased. This change 
from South Carolina notwithstanding, the general trend among states 
following the 2002 Farm Bill was to increase the lengths of recertifi-
cation intervals. The empirical analyses from Chapter 3 indicate that 
these changes help to explain why food stamp participation rose and 
why caseloads continued to increase even after the economy began to 
recover in the mid-2000s. 
In Chapter 4, we used the administrative data to investigate how 
food stamp participation spells varied across counties in our three states 
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that were and were not subject to work requirements and 3-month time 
limits for ABAWDs. Time limits on food stamp participation were 
imposed as part of the PRWORA. However, that legislation allowed 
states to exempt ABAWDs living in areas with weak job markets, and 
subsequent legislation and policy changes allowed states to waive the 
requirements for other ABAWDs. All three of our analysis states sought 
exemptions and waivers, and these serve as the basis for our empirical 
comparisons. Our empirical analyses show that adult-only households 
with members who were 18–49 years old were more likely to leave the 
Food Stamp Program in the first few months of their participation spells 
if they lived in counties with ABAWD work rules and time limits than if 
they lived in counties that were exempt from these rules. The difference 
in food stamp exit behavior was less evident in later months of food 
stamp spells; they were also less evident for households with children 
and for elderly households who were less likely to include ABAWDs. 
During the period that we examine, the use of exemptions and waivers 
increased among states, which had the effect of weakening the ABAWD 
work rules. Our analyses indicate that these changes also contributed to 
the overall increase in Food Stamp Program participation. 
There were other ways in which food stamp policies were relaxed 
during the 2000s. We now turn to discuss these and other possible pol-
icy changes. 
INCOME REPORTING AND ELIGIBILITY WITHIN
CERTIFICATION PERIODS 
As we mentioned, food stamp households generally receive less 
scrutiny and provide less supporting information during their certifica-
tion periods than at the ends of those periods. On top of that, USDA
policies and the 2002 Farm Bill allowed states to decrease the types 
and frequency of income changes that had to be reported. In the late 
1990s, the USDA had two stated income reporting policies that states 
could adopt: a monthly periodic-reporting policy in which households 
reported their circumstances each month regardless of whether any 
income changes occurred, and a change-reporting policy in which 
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households were required to report any changes of more than $25 in 
monthly income within 10 days of the change occurring. States could 
apply different policies to different types of clients. In addition, USDA 
approved waivers for states with periodic-reporting policies that wanted 
to use quarterly reporting for households with earnings. 
In late 2000, the USDA gave states the option of adopting semian-
nual reporting for working households with 6-month or longer certifi-
cation periods, in which the households were required to report only 
changes in income that brought them above the gross eligibility limit of 
130 percent of the federal poverty threshold (Food and Nutrition Ser-
vice 2000). For states with change-reporting policies, including some 
states with quarterly and semiannual reporting, the USDA approved 
waivers for states to require limited types of change reporting including 
• status reporting: changes in having or not having a job, changes 
in part-time or full-time status, or changes in wage rates, 
• five-hour reporting: changes in weekly work amounting to more 
than five hours, or 
• $100 reporting: changes in earnings of more than $100. 
By early 2002, 9 states required monthly reporting, 6 (including 
South Carolina) required quarterly reporting, 19 (including Georgia and 
Missouri) required semiannual reporting, and the rest relied on some 
type of change reporting for earners (Food and Nutrition Service 2002). 
By 2007, only three states required monthly reporting, and only one 
required quarterly reporting (Food and Nutrition Service 2007). All of 
the other states had adopted some type of simplified reporting proce-
dure for working households. 
Of the three states that we consider, Missouri required reports in 
2007 whenever monthly earnings changed by more than $100, and 
Georgia and South Carolina required reports when monthly income 
increased beyond the gross eligibility threshold. Recipients in these and 
other states were, of course, free to report any decreases in earnings that 
would allow them to receive more benefits. 
The Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008 (the 2008 Farm 
Bill) gave states more flexibility in using simplified reporting, allowing 
them to place all clients on simplified reporting, including disabled, 
elderly, and homeless clients who had not previously been eligible for 
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this policy. The use of simplified reporting remains at the state’s discre-
tion, and many states continue to adopt this optional feature only for a 
subset of their clients. 
Consider the effects of mandating a general simplified income 
reporting policy for most households.1 Under such a policy, increases 
in earnings (or other income) that occur during a certification period 
would have to be reported only if they passed the 130 percent thresh-
old. This effectively eliminates the benefit reduction rate and hence the 
implicit tax on earned income up to the threshold, increasing the reward 
associated with work. Not only does simplified income reporting incen-
tivize employment and work effort, it also reduces compliance costs for 
households, which increases participation. It also reduces compliance 
costs for state administrators. Thus, the policy can increase economic 
self-sufficiency and boost families’ access to food, while reducing 
administrative burdens for states. 
The principal drawback of simplified income reporting is that it 
increases program costs by reducing the accuracy of targeting—normal 
means-testing is applied at the start of a certification period, but limited 
means-testing only occurs for the subsequent duration of the period. 
Another drawback to the policy is that it can create a notch or cliff in 
the household’s budget set that harshly penalizes earnings above the 
130 percent threshold. It seems likely that relaxed income reporting 
requirements contributed to longer spells, larger caseloads, and a higher 
incidence of work among food stamp families. A uniform policy of sim-
plified income reporting would help working families. 
There is a logical extension to this policy that may encourage work 
further—eliminate income reporting altogether within set periods or for 
the entire certification period. Under such a policy, incomes and other 
eligibility information would be reported at initial application and at 
each recertification but not in between. During the years that we study, 
California had a policy of quarterly-periodic reporting in which food 
stamp households reported their incomes every three months, instead of 
every month or when incomes changed. Within the quarter, incomes for 
California food stamp recipients could rise above the gross eligibility 
threshold, but the households would maintain their benefits. Califor-
nia’s periodic-reporting policy eliminates the notch in the budget con-
straint within periods, though it does increase the frequency of income 
reporting compared to simplified semiannual income reporting. 
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Another existing food stamp policy—transitional food stamp ben-
efits—effectively eliminates income reporting. The 2002 Farm Bill 
authorized states to offer transitional benefits to households that left 
the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program. These 
benefits are set at the level that the family was receiving while on 
TANF, possibly with an increase to reflect the loss of TANF income, 
and are authorized for up to five months, during which income report-
ing requirements are dropped. In October 2003, 10 states were offering 
transitional benefits (Food and Nutrition Service 2003), and by Novem-
ber 2007, so were Georgia and 6 additional states (Food and Nutrition 
Service 2007). The 2008 Farm Bill added more flexibility by allow-
ing states to offer transitional benefits to families who left state-funded 
assistance programs, rather than just those who left federally supported 
TANF programs. 
There is also precedent for the elimination of income reporting 
in other food assistance programs. Children’s eligibility for free and 
reduced-price meals in the National School Lunch and School Break-
fast Programs is determined for the duration of a school year and for up 
to one month in the subsequent school year, even if their households’
economic circumstances improve in the interim. Similarly, assistance 
under the Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants 
and Children is certified for periods ranging from six weeks to a year, 
depending on the beneficiaries, with no income reporting requirement 
within the certification period. 
Critics might object that the elimination of income reporting within 
certification periods would undermine the Food Stamp Program’s tar-
geting objective, allowing some families with relatively high incomes 
to receive benefits for short periods of time. However, an argument can 
be made that the elimination of income reporting actually makes the 
program fairer. The issue is that food stamp application and eligibility 
procedures mostly target prospective disadvantage but not retrospec-
tive disadvantage. Consider a working household with no other sources 
of income that suddenly loses its source of employment and earnings. 
Unless the household applies immediately for food stamp benefits, it 
will go some time without assistance. It is not possible under the cur-
rent program to recover benefits retrospectively from an earlier period 
of eligibility that preceded an application. Simplified income reporting 
policies and long-interval periodic reporting policies can increase fair-
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ness by making up on the back end what the program fails to provide 
on the front end. 
REDUCE OTHER PARTICIPATION BARRIERS 
The federal rules for the Food Stamp Program count the fair market 
values beyond $4,650 of vehicles for each household adult and com-
muting teenager as financial resources, which are included in the asset 
test for determining program eligibility. The federal rules exempt vehi-
cles under some circumstances, such as when they are used to produce 
income, used to travel long distances to work, and used as people’s 
homes. At the same time, they are less generous with extra vehicles, 
counting the entire fair market value for them. The vehicle rules may 
be detrimental to working families with members who commute, espe-
cially rural workers who not only confront long travel distances but also 
have few, if any, public transportation options. 
Over the time period that we considered, states were granted con-
siderable flexibility to relax these vehicle policies. First, states were 
allowed to expand the types of households that were categorically eli-
gible for food stamps. Recall that categorically eligible households only 
have to meet the income and asset requirements of the “other” assis-
tance program. The vehicle and resource requirements of these pro-
grams are often less stringent than those of the Food Stamp Program. 
Under the original program rules, households were categorically eli-
gible if all their members received benefits from TANF, SSI, or General 
Assistance. Under the expanded option, households could be categori-
cally eligible if any of the members received a TANF-funded or related 
state-funded benefit or service that helped the rest of the household, 
so long as the household’s gross income was below twice the poverty 
level. By 2007, 35 states, including Georgia, Missouri, and South Caro-
lina, had adopted some form of such broad-based categorical eligibility. 
To see how broad-based categorical eligibility works, consider 
Georgia’s policy. Households there that apply for food stamps are first 
screened for eligibility in the state’s TANF Community Outreach Ser-
vices (TCOS) program, which provides information and referral ser-
vices to households with incomes below 130 percent of the poverty 
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line (or 200 percent on the poverty line if the household has elderly or 
disabled members). If the household meets these standards, the case-
worker discusses the available services with the applicant, hands the 
applicant a brochure, and has the applicant sign a “Rights and Respon-
sibilities” statement, thereby conferring services. Households thus 
enrolled in the TCOS program are then categorically eligible for food 
stamps. The TCOS program has no asset requirements, and its gross 
income standards are exactly the same as those of the Food Stamp Pro-
gram. Through this bit of administrative wizardry, Georgia food stamp 
clients are absolved of the federal resource requirements involving not 
only vehicles but also all financial assets. 
The second option for states comes from provisions in the Agricul-
ture, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration, and Related 
Appropriations Act of 2001 (P.L. 106-387) and the subsequent 2002 
Farm Bill. These provisions allowed states to realign their food stamp 
vehicle policies with the policies in place for their other assistance pro-
grams if those other policies were more favorable to clients. 
By 2007, all states had modified their rules for some or all of their 
food stamp recipients, including 33 that had adopted rules from their 
TANF programs, 10 that adopted rules from their child care or foster 
care assistance programs, and 8 that expanded their definition of cat-
egorical eligibility to include households receiving services and in-kind 
benefits from their TANF programs. This resulted in 29 states effec-
tively excluding all vehicles from the asset tests, 16 excluding at least 
one vehicle per household from the tests, and the remainder exceeding 
the federal exclusion value of $4,650 for one or more vehicles. 
Of the states that we examine, Missouri began excluding an extra 
portion of households’ vehicle values in August 2000, following the 
approval of a waiver from the USDA. Since July 2001 Missouri has 
excluded the value of all vehicles. South Carolina also liberalized its 
vehicle policies early in our study period, with changes that went into 
effect in April 2001. The state currently excludes the value of all vehi-
cles from eligibility calculations. In contrast, Georgia was one of the 
last states in the country to relax its vehicle policies, changing its poli-
cies in 2006. 
Although vehicle rules represent a potential barrier to food stamp 
participation, quantitative analyses suggest that their effects are mod-
est. Cunnyngham and Ohls (2008) simulate food stamp eligibility for 
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households under different sets of asset policies. They find that most 
households that appeared to be eligible under the asset rules in place in 
their state of residence in January 2007 would have remained eligible if 
their state had adopted another state’s rules. Only 11 percent of house-
holds were “marginally eligible” in the sense that their eligibility would 
have changed in more than a handful of other states. Of these margin-
ally eligible households, nearly half had incomes above the 130 per-
cent gross income threshold (many of these higher-income households 
had elderly or disabled members), and 41 percent would have qualified 
only for the minimum food stamp benefit. Cunnyngham and Ohls also 
simulate how eligibility would change if states reverted to the narrower 
federal asset policies. Their analysis indicates that only 8 percent of 
initially eligible households were at risk of losing their eligibility from 
this type of policy change. They do not examine actual participation. 
However, the modest size of the eligibility changes coupled with the 
tiny benefits for many of the eligible households suggest that the par-
ticipation effects are small. 
Hanratty (2006) directly examines the relationship between partici-
pation and vehicle policies using household-level survey data and finds 
no significant association. In contrast, Ratcliffe, McKernan, and Fine-
gold (2008) find evidence that relaxing vehicle policies did increase 
food stamp participation. 
Even if a general policy of excluding vehicles from the calculation 
of assets only modestly boosts participation, the policy still could well 
be worthwhile. The evidence from Cunnyngham and Ohls indicates that 
the most stringent federal vehicle rules would affect outcomes only for 
a small proportion of households. Nevertheless, screening for vehicles 
requires collecting, tracking, and maintaining information for all house-
holds. If vehicles were excluded, the administrative costs and burdens 
for clients and state agencies could be reduced. In all, the change would 
simplify the Food Stamp Program, making it easier to administer and 
understand. 
The food stamp vehicle rules are part of a broader policy involv-
ing asset eligibility. For much of the recent history of the Food Stamp 
Program, the asset test has limited eligibility to fixed amounts. In 2001, 
these amounts were $3,000 for elderly households and $2,000 for all 
other households. The 2002 Farm Bill increased the limit for disabled 
households to the same $3,000 as elderly households but still left the 
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amounts fixed in nominal terms. Asset limits are an obvious barrier to 
participation; they also discourage savings among food stamp house-
holds. Even among poor families that are not currently receiving ben-
efits, a substantial portion may choose to minimize savings in order 
to assure eligibility for means-tested programs if needed in the future 
(Wellschmied 2015). Because of creeping inflation, the barrier has 
become more stringent over time. Broad-based categorical eligibility 
allows states to waive not only the vehicle requirements but also the 
asset requirements altogether. Thus, the wider adoption of expanded 
categorical eligibility has eliminated the asset barrier for households in 
many states.2 
The 2008 Farm Bill loosened the restriction even more. For the first 
time since asset limits were established, the legislation indexes them 
for inflation.3 The 2008 Farm Bill also excluded certain types of tax-
advantaged savings accounts, such as individual retirement accounts 
and educational savings accounts, from the calculation of assets. 
IMPROVING BENEFITS 
The USDA sets the maximum food stamp benefit amounts for 
households each year based on the cost of its Thrifty Food Plan (TFP), 
which is a basket of foods that can be obtained at low cost but still 
provide a nutritious diet. In principle, this approach to setting benefits 
should lead to adequate food assistance; however, there are questions 
regarding whether this is the case (Caswell and Yaktine 2013; Hartline-
Grafton and Weill 2012). For one thing, food stamp benefits are set 
annually using a TFP value that is lagged by several months. Inflation— 
from the time that benefits are set and over the course of the year while 
benefits are nominally fixed—erodes their real value, causing them to 
fall below contemporaneous TFP values.4 The TFP also relies on strong 
assumptions about households’ capabilities and time availability. For 
example, the TFP is based on many meals that require substantial 
amounts of preparation and cooking time. The underlying time assump-
tions may be unrealistic for working households, and food stamp ben-
efits could be inadequate if these households have to consume more 
expensive, prepared foods. Third, the TFP, which is the least expensive 
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USDA food plan, leaves little margin for errors, possible food waste, or 
other problems. 
The net food stamp benefit formula, which reduces the maximum 
allotment by 20 percent less for changes in earned income than changes 
in unearned income, already recognizes that working households may 
have more costs than other households, such as commuting and cloth-
ing costs. An even higher allotment for working households could be 
justified by these households’ higher food costs. More adequate benefits 
for working households would increase their access to nutritious foods 
and encourage participation. 
Several changes to the net benefit formula have led to more gen-
erous benefits. The 2002 Farm Bill changed the formula’s standard 
deduction so that it varied with family size and would subsequently rise 
with inflation. The legislation also let states use a simplified Standard 
Utility Allowance rather than have households present actual utility 
bills to claim an allowance. This change made it easier for households 
to deduct the allowance. The 2008 Farm Bill increased the standard 
deduction for households with one to three members, removed the cap 
on child care expenses, and increased the minimum benefit for house-
holds with one or two members. 
The maximum benefit itself was temporarily increased by 13.6 per-
cent as part of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 
(ARRA). This substantial increase in benefits was targeted primarily 
at stimulating the economy as the United States was plunging into the 
depths of the Great Recession. The benefit increase remained in effect 
until October 2013, when it reverted to the previous amount of 100 
percent of the TFP. During the early years of the recession, however, 
the benefit increase was estimated to have contributed to a 3 percent 
increase in the food stamp participation rate as well as an improvement 
in households’ food security (Nord and Prell 2011). 
REDUCING SANCTIONS FOR ABAWDS AND OTHERS 
The three-month time limit on food stamp benefit receipt for non-
working ABAWDs is an unusually harsh and arguably inhumane policy. 
Nonelderly adults who are neither parents nor disabled are categorically 
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ineligible for cash assistance from the TANF, Supplemental Security 
Income, or Social Security Disability Income programs. At one time, 
many ABAWDs would have been eligible for state-funded General 
Assistance (GA) programs. However, the number of states operating 
such programs has greatly diminished. Schott and Cho (2011) survey 
states and find that the number offering GA to employable adults fell 
from 25 in 1989 to only 12 in 2011 and that the number offering GA 
to unemployable adults shrank from 38 to 30.5 Schott and Cho further 
report that many of the states that have maintained programs have cut 
benefits, tightened eligibility, imposed time limits, or enacted a combi-
nation of these changes. 
The stark reality is that the Food Stamp Program is the last strand 
in the social safety net for most ABAWDs. Wolkwitz and Leftin (2008) 
estimate that in FY 2007 nearly half (46 percent) of food stamp house-
holds with ABAWD members and nearly two-thirds (62 percent) of 
ABAWDs living alone had no other countable income whatsoever. 
With no earnings and with no other public assistance to turn to, the loss 
of food stamp benefits at the expiration of a time limit can mean the 
difference between having some resources for food or none at all. Effec-
tively, hunger and the withdrawal of food are the “incentives” being 
used to “encourage” work—choices that would not be out of place in a 
Dickens novel. 
It does not have to be this way. Indeed, the ABAWD time limits 
were temporarily suspended as part of the 2008 ARRA stimulus legisla-
tion. So, for a short period, the time limits disappeared. However, the 
suspension ended in FY 2011. 
Although the time limits have resumed, they could be made less 
onerous. The present work-related time limit constitutes a full-benefit 
sanction—once the time limit is imposed no benefits are issued until 
either the work requirement is fulfilled or the 36-month time window 
has closed. A more humane alternative that still preserves an incen-
tive to work is to impose a partial-benefit sanction, such as a mod-
est percentage reduction in the food stamp benefit or a restriction on 
the way that benefits can be redeemed. Because the food stamp benefit 
amount is already slightly below the TFP, it might be more humane 
still to modestly increase benefits beyond the TFP for participants who 
comply with work and other rules and to keep benefits at their present 
level for others. 
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OUTREACH AND INFORMATION 
One reason that disadvantaged and otherwise eligible households 
might not participate in the Food Stamp Program is that they lack 
information about the program, their possible eligibility, or application 
procedures. Daponte, Sanders, and Taylor (1999) conduct a random-
assignment demonstration with Pennsylvania food pantry clients and 
find that they were more likely to apply to the Food Stamp Program 
if they were presented with information about the program. Stigma is 
also frequently mentioned as a reason that otherwise eligible people 
fail to enroll in public assistance programs (Moffitt 1983). A survey 
of food stamp participants and eligible nonparticipants in 1996–1997 
indicated that three quarters of eligible nonparticipants did not know 
they were eligible. Although only a minority of survey respondents per-
ceived stigma associated with participation, such perceptions had a role 
in explaining nonparticipation (Ponza et al. 1999). 
Outreach efforts are an important tool for increasing information, 
reducing stigma, and boosting participation. The USDA has funded 
millions of dollars of outreach grants to state and local organizations; it 
has also subsidized the costs of outreach plans in selected states. Some 
of the plans are targeted toward providing brochures and other informa-
tion at places frequented by working families. During the period we 
studied, Georgia and South Carolina engaged in outreach efforts with 
USDA-provided funding, but Missouri did not. 
While the outreach efforts may have increased participation, it is 
difficult to assess their effects because the activities are not systemati-
cally documented, and there is little way to determine whether or when 
households might have been exposed to outreach messages. Research-
ers who have attempted to examine the effects of outreach have tended 
to use crude measures, such as the amount of expenditures per person 
or per poor person in a state. Results using these measures have been 
inconclusive. For example, Ratcliffe, McKernan, and Finegold (2008) 
find that state outreach expenditures were significantly positively asso-
ciated with food stamp participation in some specifications and for 
some samples but insignificantly associated in other specifications and 
for other samples. The potential importance of outreach is captured in 
a recent qualitative study that compares state agency policies regard-
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ing the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) in Oregon 
and Florida (Edwards et al. 2016). The U.S. General Accounting Office 
(2004) recommends improving the documentation and tracking of spe-
cific outreach activities. 
WHERE DOES FOOD ASSISTANCE GO FROM HERE? 
The grip on the food stamp policy balloon has been relaxed before. 
Following the nationwide rollout of the program in the 1960s and 1970s, 
the program saw a further significant expansion when the program’s 
original requirement that households purchase food stamps with their 
own money was dropped in favor of simply distributing coupons to 
participating families. However, the grip has also sometimes tightened. 
The last major tightening occurred in the early and middle 1990s 
and culminated in the maximum benefit reductions, ABAWD work 
requirements, and other provisions of the PRWORA. Those changes 
were enacted alongside other changes that moved the U.S. social safety 
net away from simple income maintenance and toward work support. 
Open-ended cash assistance programs such as TANF and GA were 
scaled back, and work requirements and time limits were imposed. 
Between 1996 and 2010, the grip on the Food Stamp Program 
policy balloon relaxed, with many of the changes focused on provid-
ing positive inducements for working households rather than limits or 
punishments for nonworking households. These changes included lon-
ger recertification intervals for working households, simplified income 
reporting for earnings, transitional benefit alternatives, and relaxed 
vehicle rules. Other changes, such as expanded exemptions and waivers 
for the ABAWD work rules, smoothed some of the harshest elements of 
the PRWORA, and still others, such as expanded categorical eligibility, 
more generous net benefit formulas, looser asset limits, and greater out-
reach spending, increased the generosity and reach of the program. This 
phase of policy relaxation culminated in the temporary benefit increases 
and ABAWD work rule suspensions of the 2008 ARRA. 
Even in the face of a very slow recovery following the 2007–2009 
recession, a modest tightening in rules began after 2010. The tempo-
rary benefit increases in the ARRA were reversed effective in 2013, 
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five years prior to the sunset date in the original legislation. The maxi-
mum benefit allotment reverted to its PRWORA level, and the ABAWD 
time limits returned as labor markets across states began to recover. At 
the state level, the momentum toward increased accessibility has been 
slowed, or possibly even reversed. No additional states have adopted 
broad-based categorical eligibility since 2013, and one state (Louisi-
ana) actually discontinued implementation.6 Some states have reversed 
prior moves toward liberalization of their eligibility rules. Since 2012, 
Michigan and Maine have reinstated asset limits for SNAP recipients. 
Pennsylvania reestablished a limit in 2012, but then eliminated it in 
2015. 
Debates over reauthorization of SNAP in 2013 involved major 
challenges to the structure of the program. Proposals to increase work 
requirements for program participation, to eliminate broad-based cat-
egorical eligibility, and to bar for life those convicted of violent crimes 
had strong support from the Republican majority in the House of Rep-
resentatives. At one point, a provision allowing states to administer 
drug tests to SNAP applicants was approved. In July 2013, the House 
passed a reauthorization of the Farm Bill that excluded SNAP, which 
had accounted for up to 80 percent of the bill’s funding in prior bills. In 
the end, the 2014 Farm Bill that became law after conference agreement 
between the House and the Senate retained the basic structure of SNAP
and omitted the major limits on eligibility that had characterized the 
House version (Gitter 2015, Chapter 4). The only substantive change 
was modification of the net benefit formula to make it slightly less gen-
erous by limiting a practice used in 17 states that provided energy cred-
its to some households regardless of actual expenses. 
In the period since 2014, critics of SNAP have garnered increased 
influence in the debate over the program’s reauthorization. The Ameri-
can use of the term welfare to refer to AFDC and then TANF has now 
been expanded to include SNAP, reflecting its role as a target.7 Although 
the defenders of the program remain, those who question the legiti-
macy of government redistribution have turned their attention to SNAP. 
Prominent criticism includes the suggestion that, in conjunction with 
other programs, SNAP has substantially reduced work incentives (Mul-
ligan 2012, 2015) and that it has abetted the growth in obesity among 
the poor.8 In February 2017, the Committee on Agriculture in the House 
held hearings on the benefits and costs of restricting SNAP purchases, 
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with the primary focus on prohibiting the purchase of sweetened soda 
and similar drinks to improve the nutritional quality of recipients’ diets. 
Although opponents to such restrictions dominated the hearings, their 
tone clearly reflected the view that greater restrictions on recipients’ 
purchases might well be in order (Committee on Agriculture 2017). 
In February 2018, as part of the administration’s budget, the U.S. 
secretary of agriculture proposed that each SNAP household receive 
half of its aid in the form of a “Harvest Box,” with food chosen to pro-
vide nutritional benefit and to aid American farmers. The response was 
strongly negative, and it was never seriously considered in the reautho-
rization bill, but again the proposal clearly reflected popular support 
for the idea that the SNAP program should apply greater constraints on 
recipient purchases (Thrush 2018). 
The House reauthorization bill, the Agriculture Improvement Act of 
2018, included work requirements that would change SNAP’s structure 
in a major way. Under the bill, most adult recipients under age 60 in 
families with no children age 6 or younger would have to engage in a 
work activity for at least 20 hours per week. In contrast, the bill passed 
by the Senate did not include similar provisions. In the final conference 
version of the bill, the most restrictive provisions were removed, leav-
ing the structure of SNAP largely unchanged. However, the long-term 
prospects remain uncertain, and even if there are no important modifi-
cations of SNAP in the near future, the pressure to pare down the pro-
gram and restrict the options available to recipients remains. 
Despite these challenges to SNAP, the ultimate collapse of SNAP
as a central pillar of the safety net is not inevitable. Many of the pro-
posals suggested in this book build on an attempt to encourage self-
sufficiency, and, although the current climate would appear to favor 
general retrenchment for the program, changes that focus on providing 
work incentives may receive substantial support. If the current eco-
nomic expansion continues, such policies may be perceived as ways to 
increase work at the same time they aid a small number of recipients 
who are left behind. 
Many of the supportive changes made since 1996 were left as state 
options, and this has led to an uneven food assistance landscape in 
which work and participation among food stamp recipients are better 
supported in some states than others. As noted in Chapter 1, even as 
participation rates have continued to increase over the past decade, the 
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participation gap between eligible individuals who are employed and 
those who are not remains large. Policies such as simplified income 
reporting and vehicle exemptions, which have been adopted by nearly 
all states, should be part of the standard federal program or at least the 
default. The adequacy of the maximum household benefit needs to be 
carefully considered, and the efficacy—not to mention the morality—of 
withholding food assistance from people with no other resources needs 
to be scrutinized. 
Notes 
1. States would most likely want to maintain stricter reporting policies for some 
households, such as those on cash assistance and those subject to work rules and 
time limits. They also would not want to impose tougher policies for some others, 
including those receiving transitional food stamp benefits. 
2. States have been slow to publicize the elimination of asset limits, and potential 
applicants in many states are routinely given information suggesting that their 
assets may preclude SNAP eligibility (Heflin, Mueser, and Cronin 2015). 
3. Although the limits are now indexed, they are only allowed to change in $250 
increments. 
4.	 Prior to 1996, food stamp benefits were set at 103 percent of the TFP to address 
the problem of inflation. However, the PRWORA cut the benefit formula to 100 
percent of the TFP. 
5. Between 1989 and 2011, Missouri and South Carolina eliminated statewide GA
programs. Georgia eliminated its GA program in the early 1980s. 
6. See Falk and Aussenberg (2014) and Aussenberg and Falk (2018).  
7.	 This usage is illustrated by the website “Federal Safety Net,” which identifies 
SNAP as the third largest U.S. welfare program, after Medicaid and the Earned 
Income Tax Credit (federalsafetynet.com, accessed Sept. 2, 2018). Wikipedia 
references the older usage, observing that TANF “is often referred to simply as 
‘welfare’.” (en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Temporary_ Assistance_for_Needy_Families, 
accessed Sept. 2, 2018). 
8. Gunderson (2016) argues that there is little evidence in support of this claim. 
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